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Abstract
This paper examines the disciplinary effect of foreign institutional investors on
opportunistic insider trading. Using a novel global insider trading data set con-
taining 35,557 firms from 26 countries over the period 2000-2015, we find that
greater foreign institutional ownership significantly reduces the profitability of
insider trading, above and beyond the effect of domestic institutional owner-
ship. Using the exogenous variation in foreign institutional ownership induced
by MSCI index inclusion, we show that the effect is causal. The impact of for-
eign investors is stronger in countries with weak insider trading regulations and
poor institutional environments, and operates mainly through the monitoring
channel, rather than the channel of improved information environments.
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1 Introduction
Corporate officers and directors have privileged access to private information about
their firms’ prospects. Hence, their trades of their own companies’ stocks are among
the most scrutinized activities in the market. A large body of empirical literature has
documented that insiders’ trades are informative about future stock performances,
indicating that insiders profit from having access to nonpublic information.1 Insider
trading, left unregulated, could hurt market liquidity (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)),
reduce the informational efficiency of stock prices (Fishman and Hagerty (1992)),
jeopardize investors’ confidence and discourage stock market participation (Leland
(1992)), and distort corporate investment (Manove (1989)). This has motivated al-
most all countries to enact and enforce insider trading laws that protect outside
investors from insider trades (Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)).2
However, laws and regulations may not be the only effective mechanism to deter
opportunistic insider trading. Outside shareholders may be able to discipline insider
trading by either threatening the sale of shares (“exit”) or meeting with management
(“voice”). They can also actively wield their voting rights. This market-based mecha-
nism of deterring insider trading may be more important in countries with weak legal
institutions and captured regulators, since laws and regulations are only as effective
as the enforcement of the laws.3 In addition, while legal regimes are highly persistent
over time, the monitoring role assumed by institutional investors can change relatively
swiftly.
Among all shareholders and interested parties of a firm, foreign institutional in-
vestors may play a particularly important role in monitoring insider trading, for
1See, for example, Jaffe (1974); Seyhun (1986), Lakonishok and Lee (2001); Jeng, Metrick, and
Zeckhauser (2003); Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012); and Ali and Hirshleifer (2017) etc.
2Governmental regulation of insider trading is not without controversy. Some scholars (Manne
(1966) and Carlton and Fischel (1983)) argue that insider trading should not be regulated at all
because it impounds private information into prices and improves market efficiency.
3See, for example, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002); Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005);
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008); and Edmans, Jayaraman, and Schneemeier (2017).
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several reasons. First, institutional holdings have become increasingly globalized.
According to International Monetary Fund (2015), the total asset under management
of institutional investors exceeded 70 trillion US dollars in 2014, representing more
than 100 percent of world GDP. In most countries, foreign institutional investors hold
as much assets as domestic ones (Ferreira and Matos (2008)). Second, many domestic
institutions with business ties to local corporations may feel compelled to be loyal to
management (Davis and Kim (2007)), while foreign investors are more likely to be
independent and take an active stance against the illicit behavior of corporate insid-
ers.4 Finally, there are often gaps between the legal and institutional environments of
an institutional investor’s home country and those of its destination countries. Some
prior studies suggest that institutional investors tend to promote the higher gover-
nance standards and social norms of their home countries (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira,
and Matos (2011); Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner (2017)).
Foreign investors from a country of strong legal institutions could be particularly
vocal about punishing insider trading in emerging countries, given their home-country
experience. For example, in the 2015 insider trading scandal involving Thai conve-
nience store operator CP All, foreign investors demanded tough action against top
executives, requesting governance reforms.5 The head of the local foreign institutions,
Prinn Panitchpakdi, claimed that “If we don’t see any move or statement from the
board today, we will submit a letter asking for appropriate action from the board”6.
At the same time, significant obstacles make it challenging for foreign investors
to deter insider trading: they may be less familiar with local laws and regulations
and lack informal relationships with other market participants, which can reduce the
efficacy of their monitoring. In extreme cases, it may be optimal for them to collude
4For example, Fidelity is reported to be more aggressive on governance issues in Europe, but it
is relatively acquiescent in the U.S. where it manages several corporate pension accounts.
5CP All PLC, established in 1988, is the sole operator of 7-Eleven convenience stores in Thailand,
6See “Insider trading at CP All: Foreign investors demand action”, and “Foreign investors enter
fray over CP All inaction”, Bangkok Post, 2015
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with insiders of their portfolio companies and expropriate private information for
their own benefit, given the monitoring costs and collusion benefits (Becker (1968)).
Thus, whether foreign institutional investors deter opportunistic insider trading is
ultimately an empirical question.
Investigating the relation between foreign institutional ownership and insider trad-
ing requires cross-country data on insider trading, which became available only re-
cently. We employ a novel and comprehensive database of global insider trading,
which contains 8.1 million transactions from over 200,000 insiders across a universe
of over 60,000 stocks in more than 40 countries. This is one of the first academic
studies that take advantage of this transaction-level insider trading database. We
then merge this insider trading data with global institutional ownership data from
FactSet, and stock returns and accounting information from CRSP and Compustat.
Our final sample includes 274,919 unique insiders working in 35,557 firms from 26
countries over the period 2000 to 2015.
To validate our global insider trading data, we first examine the informativeness
of insider trading around the world. This, to the best of our knowledge, has not been
documented before. Our results show that insider trading activities are generally
informative about future stock returns for most countries in our sample. Long-short
portfolios based on insiders’ net purchase ratio (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)) generate
significant Fama and French (2015) five-factor alphas7 for 17 out of 26 countries,
with a magnitude ranging from 0.24% to 0.73% per month. Insider trades are more
profitable in countries with weak insider trading regulation, and poor institutional
and information environments.
Our main analyses use firm-level panel regressions and show that foreign insti-
tutional ownership strongly reduces the profitability of insider trading. While do-
mestic institutional ownership displays a modest mitigating effect on insider trading
7In our asset pricing tests, we control for both the global and regional factors to estimate alphas.
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profitability, the impact of foreign investors is significantly greater. For example, a
one-unit increase in the insider net purchase ratio (NPR) predicts a 0.5 percentage
points increase in the next-month excess return. If domestic institutional ownership
increases by 10%, the predictability of NPR drops by 0.01 percentage points. The
same magnitude increase in foreign institutional ownership lowers insider profitabil-
ity by an additional 0.08 percentage point. Moreover, foreign institutional ownership
affects insider trading above and beyond its effect on general corporate governance
(Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011)), as the effect of foreign investors barely
changes when we control for the corporate governance index. These findings are con-
sistent with the notion that foreign institutions exert a disciplinary effect on corporate
insiders worldwide.
A potential endogeneity concern for our baseline result is the selection bias. Fer-
reira and Matos (2008) and Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2008) document that foreign
institutional investors tend to hold firms with better governance and lower insider
ownership. However, we show that our results are not driven by institutional in-
vestors’ selection of firms. In the baseline regressions, we use firm fixed-effects to
absorb time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity. We further utilize exogenous
shocks to foreign institutional ownership following the membership changes to the
MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) to isolate the causal effect. The identifica-
tion exploits the fact that foreign institutions are more likely to invest in MSCI ACWI
constituents, because international portfolios are typically benchmarked against this
index (Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks (2016)). As with previous studies, we
find foreign institutions increase their holdings by around 2% of market capitaliza-
tion when a firm’s stock is added to the MSCI ACWI, while domestic institutional
ownership decrease.8 In a differences-in-differences setting, we find that, within a
narrow bandwidth around the MSCI index cutoff, the profitability of insider trading
8MSCI ACWI eligibility is largely market cap-based. See Bena, Ferreira, Matos, and Pires (2017)
and Kacperczyk, Sundaresan, and Wang (2018) for similar identification strategy.
4
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239075 
decreases significantly after the stock is added to the MSCI index, compared with
otherwise similar stocks. This finding supports a causal interpretation that foreign
institutional ownership reduces insider trading profits.
Next, we examine the heterogeneous effects of foreign institutional investors con-
ditional on a country’s legal, institutional and information environments. Our tests
suggest that the disciplinary role of foreign investors serves mainly as a substitute for
country-level insider-trading regulations: the mitigating effect of foreign institutions
on insider trading profitability is more pronounced in countries with weak enforce-
ment of insider trading laws, in non-common law countries, and in countries with
poorer institutional infrastructure. We further examine the legal origins of foreign
institutions’ home countries : institutional investors from common-law countries more
effectively curb opportunistic insider trading than those from civil-law countries.
Our finding that foreign institutional investors reduce insider trading profitabil-
ity is potentially consistent with two non-mutually-exclusive channels. First, foreign
institutions could directly monitor insiders’ illicit behavior and take corrective ac-
tions, as they are less entangled with their portfolio companies through business
relationships (the “monitoring” channel). Second, foreign institutional ownership
may reduce insider trading profitability by improving the information efficiency of
the stock.9 To the extent that insiders profit from private information and better in-
formation environments impound private information into stock prices more quickly,
foreign investors may mitigate insider trading profitability through the “information”
channel.10
We conduct several tests to disentangle the two channels. First, we show that even
after controlling for several proxies of firms’ information environments, foreign insti-
9Several studies have shown that institutional investors could improve firms’ information environ-
ment and price efficiency, either in the U.S. (Boehmer and Kelley (2009)) or globally (Kacperczyk,
Sundaresan, and Wang (2018)).
10Several studies document that insider trades are more profitable in firms characterized by higher
information asymmetry, such as firms followed by fewer analysts (Frankel and Li (2004)) and with
higher R&D intensity (Aboody and Lev (2000)).
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tutional ownership still reduces insider profitability with a similar intensity. Second,
by examining the timing of insider trades, we find that insiders in firms with higher
foreign ownership shift more trades to the month right after earnings announcements,
to avoid trading in information-intensive periods. This evidence suggests that firms,
under the pressure of foreign institutions, start to impose blackout periods for insider
trading, which has been shown to effectively reduce insider trading profitability (Bet-
tis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000)). Third, the disciplinary effect of foreign investors
is asymmetric, stronger for insider sales than insider purchases. This is consistent
with the monitoring channel, as prior studies have shown that insider sales ahead of
negative news are associated with greater litigation risks compared with insider pur-
chases (Cheng and Lo (2006); Rogers (2008)). Lastly, we decompose insider trades
into those conducted by top-tier insiders versus low-tier insiders, and find that for-
eign institutions reduce the profitability of trades made by top-tier insiders relative
to trades made by lower-tier insiders. This is consistent with top-tier insiders being
directly monitored by institutional investors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys related
literature and discusses the contribution of this study. Section 3 describes the data
and presents the summary statistics. Section 4 presents our main results for the
effect of foreign institutions on insider trading profitability and its heterogeneous
effect. Section 5 examines the economic channels. Section 6 presents robustness tests
and examines alternative explanations. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature and Contribution
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes to a
growing literature that examines the effect of federal regulation and firm-level gover-
nance mechanisms on the mitigation of informed trading by corporate insiders. At
6
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the country-level, an overwhelming amount of evidence has been drawn from the U.S.,
where the SEC is the main regulatory agency responsible for enforcing insider trading
laws. Confirming the important role of the SEC, Del Guercio, Odders-White, and
Ready (2017) document that aggressive SEC enforcement deters illegal insider trading
(measured by price run-up before news events) and helps improve market liquidity.
Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) and Akbas, Jiang, and Koch (2018) show that
SEC enforcement actions are more likely to target opportunistic insiders, and that
insider trading activities abate following waves of SEC enforcement. Taking advan-
tage of a regulatory change requiring more timely disclosure of insider trades, Brochet
(2010) find that insiders are less likely to sell ahead of negative private information
after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). At the firm-level,
Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) show that self-imposed insider trading policies
(ITP) are effective in suppressing insider trading profits. Ravina and Sapienza (2009)
show that independent directors’ trades are more profitable in firms with weak gover-
nance, while Dai, Fu, Kang, and Lee (2016) find that better-governed firms have lower
profitability of insider sales ahead of negative news. In addition to internal gover-
nance mechanisms, studies also explore various external governance mechanisms that
can discipline insider trading, including news dissemination by media (Dai, Parwada,
and Zhang (2015)) and institutional investors (Dai, Fu, Kang, and Lee (2016)).
Evidence from outside the U.S. is more limited.11 The majority of cross-country
studies on insider trading examine how the initial enactment and enforcement of
insider trading laws affects various economic outcomes including the informational
efficiency of financial markets (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005); Fernandes and
Ferreira (2008)), cost of equity (Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)), and real economic
efficiency (Edmans, Jayaraman, and Schneemeier (2017)), without showing the direct
11See Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) for insider trading in UK and Dardas and Gu¨ttler
(2011) for evidence from European countries.
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effect of these laws/regulations on intensity of opportunistic insider trading.12 We
complement these studies by documenting the direct evidence that insider trades are
more informative in countries with insufficient insider trading regulations and poor
institutional infrastructures. More importantly, we show that when governmental
regulations fail to effectively curb insider trading, foreign institutional investors could
step in and act as a partial substitute for inferior institutional environments.
Our paper also contributes to the literature that explores the impact of foreign in-
stitutional investors’ on a wide range of corporate outcomes. Gillan and Starks (2003),
Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) show that
foreign institutional investors are more active in improving firms’ governance. Dyck,
Lins, Roth, and Wagner (2017) shows that foreign institutional investors transplant
their social norms regarding E&S issues around the world. Bena, Ferreira, Matos,
and Pires (2017) find that foreign institutional ownership fosters long-term tangible
and intangible investments. Our findings that foreign investors mitigate insider trad-
ing are broadly consistent with the idea that foreign institutions exert a disciplinary
effect on entrenched corporate insiders worldwide. The advantage of our setting is
that, unlike other firm-level governance attributes that are highly persistent and slow
moving, insider trading activities occur at a higher frequency.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
3.1 Global insider transaction data
Our global insider transaction data is obtained from 2iQ Research, a global data
company that specializes in monitoring and analyzing share transactions made by
directors and officers of public firms around the world. In aggregate, the 2iQ database
12Notable exceptions include Fidrmuc, Korczak, and Korczak (2013) on how country-level share-
holder protection affects the informativeness of insider trading and Brochet (2017) on the predictabil-
ity of insider trades for aggregate market return.
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contains 8.1 million transactions from over 200,000 insiders across a universe of over
60,000 stocks in 50 countries with an average history across all regions of 12 years.
The data are sourced from stock exchanges, news portals, or company announcements
made public under disclosure regulations and enhanced with qualitative research.
Panel A of Table A1 lists the sources of insider trades data used by 2iQ for each
country/region in our sample. One caveat about this data is that since 2iQ covers
only legal insider trading that is reported to regulators, the reporting requirement and
enforcement may vary across regions. In the Internet Appendix, we provide a detailed
overview of the insider trading regulations of the major countries in our sample.
For a given transaction, the main information available includes the name and
unique ID of the insider, his or her position in the firm, the transaction type (e.g.,
purchase, sale, transfer, option exercise, award), the transaction date, the security
involved, the average price and number of shares transacted, the total transaction
value (in local currency and Euro), the insider’s post-trade holdings, and the date on
which the transaction was reported. 2iQ also includes firm identifiers such as ISIN
and SEDOL, firm name, and the country in which the transaction occurred and was
announced.
2iQ classifies all insiders into eight levels, and the definition of each level is shown
in Panel B of Table A1. We include all the insiders in levels A, B, C, and D. This
includes top five management, executive board and committee, non-executives board
members, and lower level executives. We exclude insiders of levels E, F, G, and H,
which include legal entities, funds and trusts, family and other relatives, partners,
large shareholders, founders, investors, and family holdings.
2iQ also classifies all insider trades into three significance levels: 1, 2, and 3. We
focus on insiders’ open market buy and sell transactions, by including only the trades
with significance within the top two categories (i.e., 1 and 2), and excluding private
placements and OTC trades (with a Transaction Label of PP or PR). This excludes
9
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non-intentional or mechanical transactions, awards shares, tax-related transactions,
remuneration, share plan purchases, or cases where there is no change in beneficial
holdings such as a share transfer to a spouse. This filter focuses our study on trans-
actions initiated by insiders, in which they have discretion regarding the timing and
volume of trading.
Our sample focuses on insider transactions in the home country where the firm’s
headquarter is located and where the transaction occurred and announced. We ex-
clude countries with fewer than 1,000 reported insider buys and sells for the entire
sample period, countries that started reporting to 2iQ after 2012, and one major de-
veloped market, Japan, where insider trades are not required to be reported by the
law. As a result, our final sample consists of 26 countries with varying starting years
when information on insider transactions becomes available. The US, Singapore, and
South Korea have the longest sample period starting from 2000, whereas most emerg-
ing markets (such as China and India) have data only after 2005. Finally, we exclude
firm-months before the firm had the first insider trading record and after the firm had
the last insider trading record. Restricting the sample to periods with insider trading
helps address the concern that our results are driven by selective insider reporting.13
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of insider trades for each country in our
sample. Multiple trades by the same insider of the same firm in one single day are
counted as one trade. Panel A reports the total number of reported insider trades,
average number of shares and value of transactions (in EUR) per trade, separately
for insider buys and sells. The total number of insider purchases ranges from 2,000 in
Belgium to 190,800 in the U.S., and the total number of insider sells range from 1,500
in Denmark to 543,900 in the U.S.. Although it is well known that insider sells are
much more frequent than insider purchases in the U.S., this is not the case for many
other countries. In fact, the total number of insider purchases exceeds the number
13Alternatively, we relax the criteria by including all the observations of a firm if at least one
insider trade is reported during the sample period. The results are similar.
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of insider sells in 17 of the 26 countries in our sample. However, insider sells tend
to be much larger than insider buys. The median transaction value for insider buys
ranges from 5,400 EUR in Canada to 54,800 EUR in Hong Kong, while the median
transaction value for insider sells varies from 13,900 EUR in Finland to 243,300 EUR
in the United Kingdom. In the last two columns, we report the average monthly
country-level dollar insider trading volume as a fraction of each country’s total dollar
trading volume and market capitalization, respectively. Insider trading seems to be
more prevalent in countries such as Hong Kong and Malaysia, where insider trading
activities account for more than 2% of the total volume in the market.14
Panel B of Table 1 shows the insider trades statistics at the insider and firm
level. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B report the number of unique insiders and firms
with reported insider transactions for each country. The number of unique firms with
reported insider transactions varies from 141 in Belgium to 11,131 in the U.S., and the
total number of unique firms employed in this study is 35,557. The number of unique
insiders varies from 650 in Switzerland to 98,501 in the U.S., and the total number of
unique insiders is 274,919. Column (3) reports the number of firms that appear in the
2iQ insider database as a fraction of the total number of public firms in each country.
This fraction varies from 24% in India to 85% in South Korea. Column (4) reports
the market capitalization of firms with reported insider trades as a fraction of total
market capitalization in each country. This number varies from 78% in India to over
95% for most countries in the sample, suggesting that firms with insider transaction
are typically big firms. Columns (5) and (6) report the average number of trades per
insider for each country. On average, insider trades are not very frequent, with the
median being only two to three trades per insider in our sample. Columns (7) and
(8) show the average number of insiders per firm. This number varies widely across
14One country with unexpectedly low insider trading activity is China, where insider trading
accounts for only 0.08% of the total trading volume on average. However, this is mainly due to the
high total trading activity and turnover in the Chinese stock market. If we focus instead on insider
trading volume over market capitalization, China is on par with other countries.
11
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239075 
countries, from an average of 2 insiders per firm in India to 12 insiders in Finland,
perhaps due to different legal definitions of insiders across countries.
Following Lakonishok and Lee (2001), we measure insider trading activity at firm-
month level as the net purchase ratio (NPR), defined as follows:
NPR =
#INSIDER BUYt−1,t−6 − #INSIDER SELLt−1,t−6
#TOTAL TRANSACTIONSt−1,t−6
.
NPR is calculated as the number of purchases minus the number of sells in the
past six months, scaled by the total number of transactions. NPR is bounded between
-1 and 1. A higher NPR indicates stronger intensity of insider purchases relative to
insider sells.
3.2 Global institutional ownership data
The global institutional ownership data is from FactSet, available from 1999 onward.
FactSet reports holdings for a wide range of institution types, such as mutual funds,
hedge funds, pension funds, bank trusts, and insurance companies (Ferreira and Matos
(2008)). For non-U.S. firms, FactSet collects ownership data directly from national
regulatory agencies, stock exchange announcements (e.g., the Regulatory News Ser-
vice in the U.K.), local and offshore mutual funds, mutual fund industry directories
(e.g., the European Fund Industry Directory), and company proxies and financial
reports.
Total institutional ownership (IO Total) is defined as the sum of the holdings
of all institutions in a stock divided by the stock’s total shares outstanding. For-
eign institutional ownership (IO Foreign) is defined as the sum of the holdings of
institutions domiciled in countries different from the one in which the stock’s issuing
company is headquartered, scaled by the stock’s shares outstanding. We further par-
tition foreign institutional ownership into institutional ownership from common-law
12
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countries (IO Foreign(Common)) and institutional ownership from civil-law coun-
tries (IO Foreign(Civil)), based on the legal origins of the foreign institutions’ home
countries (Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)).
In Panel C of Table 1, the average total institutional ownership is 19.18%, of
which 3.23% is held by foreign institutions. It may seem that foreign institutional
ownership is dwarfed by domestic institutional ownership. However, the average
statistics is skewed by a small number of countries, in which domestic institutions
are dominant. In fact, if we exclude the U.S. and Canada stocks, the average total
institutional ownership is 6.74%, of which 3.08% is held by foreign institutions. When
we compare the foreign institutions from common-law countries and those from civil-
law countries, the average ownership by common-law country institutions (2.21%) is
on average twice as high as the average ownership by civil-law country institutions
(0.98%).
3.3 Stock market and accounting variables
For firms in the U.S., we obtain stock returns and prices from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) and accounting data from Compustat/North America. For
firms in Canada, we obtain stock and accounting information from Compustat/North
America. For firms in other countries, data from Compustat/Global are used. We
include all domestic common stocks listed on the major stock exchange(s) in each
country. Analyst forecasts and quarterly earnings announcement dates are obtained
from I/B/E/S. We construct standard control variables in our empirical analysis.
Log(Size) is defined as the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of
June in each year. Book-to-market ratio (B/M) is the most recent fiscal year-end
report of book value divided by the market capitalization at the end of calendar year
t-1. Book value equals the value of common stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes
and investment tax credits, and minus the book value of preferred stock. Past 12-
13
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months return is defined as the cumulative holding-period return from month t-12 and
t-2. The prior month’s return captures the short term reversal effect. The summary
statistics for firm characteristics are reported in Panel C of Table 1.
We also construct several variables to proxy for firms’ information environment
and price informativeness. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts covering a
given stock. Forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of annual earnings-per-share
forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average outstanding forecast (Diether,
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)). Forecast error is defined as the absolute value of
the difference between the consensus EPS forecast and the actual EPS scaled by
the absolute value of the actual EPS. We use price non-synchronicity to measure
price informativeness. For each firm i in month t belonging to country j, we regress
the monthly return of the stock RETi,j,t on the value-weighted local market return
MKTRETj,t and the value-weighted US market return MKTRETUS,t using data
from past 36 months, with a minimum of 15 observations.
RETi,j,t = α + β1MKTRETj,t + β2MKTRETUS,t + i,j,t
Following Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2006), we define price non-synchronicity
(NONSYNCH) as 1 − R2, where R2 is the coefficient of determination from the
estimation of the above equation. Negative adjusted R2 numbers are trimmed at
0.0001. We use the Amihud illiquidity (Amihud (2002))15 and the frequency of zero
return trading days (Lesmond (2005)) to measure stock liquidity.
3.4 Country-level variables
Our analysis includes several country-level variables related to the legal and institu-
tional environments of sample countries. Table A2 reports the descriptive statistics
15Amihud = Average( |rt|V olumet ), where rt is the stock return on day t and V olumet is the dollar
trading volume on day t.
14
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239075 
for these country characteristics.
We use two country-level variables to capture the extent of insider trading in a
country.16 “Blackout” is the difference between the percentage of insider trades that
occur within one month after an earnings announcement and one month before it, as
described by Brochet (2017). “Insider trading regulation” measures the effectiveness
of insider trading regulation elicited from global surveys on corporate officers, which
we get from Du and Wei (2004). Our measure of country-level information environ-
ments includes the accounting quality index from Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1998), which is based on the reporting or omission of 90 items in cor-
porate financial reporting. Auditing quality is measured as the proportion of firms
audited by one of the Big 4 firms in a country (based on 2012 WorldScope data). We
measure the legal system using Legal Origin, a binary indicator that takes the value
of 1 if the origin of the country’s legal system is common law and 0 otherwise (Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)). We use three indicators, namely the
rule of law, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality from Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators to measure general institutional quality at country-level (Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011)). These indicators combine views and survey results and
are intended to measure governance quality at the country level.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Informativeness of insider trading around the world
Before investigating the relation between foreign institutional ownership and insider
profitability at firm level, we provide evidence of the informativeness of insider trading
around the world. To our knowledge, this has not been documented before because
16We do not use the year insider trading law was enacted and first enforced (Bhattacharya and
Daouk (2002)) in each country to proxy for insider trading regulation, because all (22) countries
have enacted (enforced) insider trading laws prior to the beginning of our sample period.
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of data limitations. We use portfolio sorting methodology, but our results hold using
Fama-MacBeth regression controlling for the usual cross-sectional return predictors.
Every month, we sort stocks within each country into quintiles based on insiders’
net purchase ratio (NPR) formed using data from the previous six months. We form
equal-weighted long-short portfolios by longing the top quintile stocks and shorting
the bottom quintile stocks, and hold the portfolio for three months. The average
portfolio return for month t is the equal-weighted average month t returns of the
portfolios implemented in the previous three months (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)).
Table 2 reports the time series average monthly returns and alphas for each country.
Portfolio alpha is estimated using a global version of five-factor model following Fama
and French (2017).17
Table 2 suggests that insider trading activity is generally quite informative about
future stock returns for most countries in our sample. The alphas of the long-short
portfolio are significant for 17 of the 26 countries, ranging from 0.24% to 0.73% per
month. We can benchmark the insider trading profitability in other countries against
that in the U.S.: the monthly long-short portfolio alpha for the U.S., estimated using
Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, is 0.37% (t-stat=1.93).18 Many countries,
however, generate stronger return predictability. For example, the monthly alphas
formed on NPR are 0.52%, 0.53%, 0.62% and 0.60% in Australia, Canada, South
Korea and India, respectively.19
Another fact evident from Table 2 is that the alpha of the long-short portfolio
comes mainly from the long leg. This is consistent with the US evidence that insider
17The global and regional return factors are available for download at Ken French’s website:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
18The magnitude estimated using 2iQ data is in line with studies using Thomson Reuters In-
sider Filing data. See, for example, Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) and Jeng, Metrick, and
Zeckhauser (2003).
19The return predictability of insider trading is not subsumed by firm characteristics commonly
associated with cross-sectional stock returns. In Table A3 of the Internet Appendix, we run Fama-
MacBeth regressions controlling for the past one month and twelve months returns, the natural
logarithm of market capitalization, and book-to-market ratio. Coefficients of NPR are significantly
positive in 23 of the 26 countries.
16
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239075 
purchases are much more informative than insider sales (Lakonishok and Lee (2001);
Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003)). The common explanation is that insider
sales could be driven potentially by many non-information reasons, such as liquidity
or diversification motives, while insider purchases are motivated more likely by private
information.
How does the informativeness of insider trading vary with proxies of country-level
institutional environments? This question could serve as a validation test of our
global insider trading data: one should expect the profitability of insider trades to be
larger in countries with inferior legal institutions and more opaque financial reporting
environment. To demonstrate this, we plot the cross-country relation between insider
trading profitability and country characteristics in Figure 1. The y-axis is the insider
trading profitability, measured by the average monthly long-short portfolio return
(in percentage) based on the NPR quintile rank. The x-axis represents the coun-
try characteristics, including average foreign and domestic institutional ownership,
accounting quality index, auditing quality, and three institutional quality measures
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators: government effectiveness, rule of law,
and regulatory quality.
The plots in Figure 1 are generally consistent with our prior that insider trades are
less profitable in countries with better institutional environments. Panels C and D
reveal that the average returns based on NPR are lower in countries with better finan-
cial reporting environments, as measured by accounting and auditing quality. Panels
E and F show that insider trading are less profitable in countries with more effective
insider-trading regulation, as measured by the fraction of firms with a blackout pe-
riod and the insider trading restrictiveness measure from Du and Wei (2004). Panels
G to I show the same negative relation between average insider trading profitability
and three institutional quality measures: regulatory quality, government effectiveness,
and rule of law, respectively. The negative relation is not entirely significant due to
17
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the small sample size. Nevertheless, the consistent results we obtain using different
measures of institutional environments suggest, reassuringly, that our data indeed
captures the insider trading activity in those countries.
Panel A of Figure 1 shows that there is a significant negative relation between
average foreign institutional ownership and insider trading profitability at country
level. A five percentage points increase in average foreign institutional ownership is
associated with a reduction of 0.45% of monthly return based on NPR. Panel B
shows an insignificant and flatter relation between insider trading profitability and
average domestic institutional ownership. These results provide suggestive evidence
that foreign investors are more effective in deterring opportunistic insider trading
than domestic investors. Of course, the country-level analysis cannot clearly identify
the effect of foreign investors, due to the confounding effects of other (unobserved)
country characteristics. In the next section, we will shift the analysis to firm-level. By
controlling for country-time and firm fixed effects in panel regressions, and utilizing
the exogeneous variation in foreign institutional ownership, we can better identify the
causal effect of foreign investors on the profitability of insider trading.
4.2 Foreign institutional ownership and the profitability of
insider trading
The main hypothesis of this paper is that foreign institutional ownership reduces the
profitability of insider trading. Moreover, because the interests of foreign institutional
investors may be less entangled with firm management than those of local institutional
investors, foreign institutional ownership is expected to have incremental power to
mitigate insider trading, more so than its domestic counterpart. In this section, we
empirically test these hypotheses at the firm-level.
Our baseline specifications regress future one-, three-, or six-month market-adjusted
excess return of stock i on its insider net purchase ratio (NPR), total institutional
18
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ownership (IO Total), foreign institutional ownership (IO Foreign), and the inter-
action between NPR and institutional ownership. The observations are at monthly
intervals.
ExReti,t+1→t+k = β1NPRi,t + β2NPRi,t ∗ IO Totali,t + β3NPRi,t ∗ IO Foreigni,t + β4IO Totali,t
+ β5IO Foreigni,t + β6Controlsi,t + β7Controlsi,t ∗NPRi,t + i,t
(1)
Since the main variables of interest are interaction terms, some explanation is
in order. Coefficient β1 captures the profitability of insider trading: a positive β1
suggests that the returns of stock i are higher when insider purchases are larger than
insider sales. Coefficient β2 captures the amplifying (or mitigating) effect of domestic
institutional ownership on insider profitability. A negative β2 indicates that insider
trading profitability is lower when the total institutional ownership is higher.
Most importantly, the total amplifying (or mitigating) effect of foreign institu-
tional ownership is captured by β2 + β3. If the sum is negative, it suggests that
foreign institutions reduce insider profitability. The coefficient β3 alone represents
the incremental effect that foreign institutional ownership exerts on top of domestic
institutional ownership, and the t-statistics of β3 formally test the statistical difference
between the effects of foreign and domestic institutional ownership.
As mentioned earlier, the regulations and reporting conventions of insider trading
vary across countries. To ensure that such differences do not bias our estimates, we
include country-time fixed effects in our specifications. In addition, we include firm
fixed effects to absorb unobservable heterogeneity at firm-level, since insider trading
is relatively persistent. To properly account for the time-series dependence in the
dependent variable, we cluster all standard errors at firm-level.
Table 3 shows the regression results. Columns (1) and (2) examine the future ex-
cess returns measured over one-month’s horizon. Column (2) controls for additional
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firm characteristics, including the past 1-month return, past 12-month return, loga-
rithm of a firm’s market capitalization, and book-to-market ratio. We also control for
the interaction of these firm characteristics with NPR since some of these controls are
correlated with institutional ownership and may affect insider trading profitability.20
From Column (2), NPR is shown to predict higher future stock returns. When insider
trading changes from NPR = 0 (equal number of purchases and sells) to NPR = 1
(all insider purchases), the associated monthly stock excess return increases by 0.50
percentage points. The interaction between NPR and total institutional ownership
(IO Total) is negative and significant, indicating that both domestic and foreign in-
stitutions have mitigating effect on insider profitability. When a firm has a higher
institutional ownership in general, its insider trading becomes less predictive of future
stock returns.
More importantly for our study, the interaction term betweenNPR and IO Foreign
is negative and significant (coefficient=-0.008, t = 3.43). This indicates that foreign
institutions lower the profitability of insider trading above and beyond the impact of
domestic institutions. In fact, the mitigating effect of foreign institutional ownership
is evidently more pronounced than that of domestic institutional ownership. A 10%
increase in domestic institutional ownership would reduce the profitability of insider
trading by 0.01 percentage points (0.1%∗10%), while the same magnitude of increase
in foreign institutional ownership would lower insider profitability by 0.09 percentage
points ((0.1%+0.8%)∗10%), almost an order of magnitude greater. The difference in
the mitigating effect of foreign institutional ownership on insider trading profitability
is unlikely to be driven by observable heterogeneity at firm level, as we control for
the interactions between NPR and firm size, book-to-market ratio, and past returns.
In Columns (3) to (6), we replace the dependent variable with three- and six-
month cumulative excess returns. In each specification, the interaction between NPR
20For example, foreign investors may prefer to invest in larger firms and firm size also affects
insider trading profitability.
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and IO Foreign is negative and significant. For the three-month horizon (Column
(4)), the interaction effect of domestic institutional ownership is -0.004, while the
total effect of foreign institutional ownership is -0.027 (−0.004 − 0.023). For the
six-month horizon (Column (6)), the interaction effect of domestic institutional own-
ership is -0.006, while the total effect of foreign institutional ownership is -0.048
(−0.006 − 0.042). The differences between foreign and domestic institutional own-
ership for both horizons are statistically significant at the 1% level. These results
suggest that foreign institutions curb insider trading profitability more effectively
than domestic institutions. This finding highlights the benefit of our cross-country
research design – namely that it enable us to separate the influences of domestic and
foreign institutions.21
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) show that foreign institutional own-
ership positively affects corporate governance, and prior studies also find that insider
trading is less profitable among firms with better corporate governance (Ravina and
Sapienza (2009); Dai, Fu, Kang, and Lee (2016)). However, does the foreign in-
stitutional ownership curb insider trading solely through corporate governance? To
answer this, we control for the interaction between insider trading and the corporate
governance index for a subset of firms. If foreign institutional ownership has no in-
cremental effects, the mitigating effect of IO Foreign should be expected to greatly
decrease once corporate governance is controlled for.
The corporate governance index comes from the governance attributes of Bloomberg’s
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG), and has been used in other academic
studies (e.g., Albuquerque, Branda˜o-Marques, Ferreira, and Matos (2018)).22 In
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3, we compare the coefficient of NPR∗IO Foreign with
21In Table A4, we show that our baseline findings are qualitatively unchanged in the non-U.S.
sample. Foreign institutional ownership still has incremental power to mitigate insider trading
profitability, more so domestic institutional ownership.
22We thank Pedro Matos for generously sharing the international firm-level corporate governance
data with us.
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and without the interaction between NPR and corporate governance. The results
show that the mitigating effect of foreign institutional ownership on insider trading
barely changes. This indicates that foreign institutions do more than improve tradi-
tional corporate governance measures in curbing insider trading. As discussed later,
they may engage in more direct monitoring activities in changing insider trading
behavior.
To further investigate where the mitigating effect of foreign institutional ownership
lies, we separate out insider purchases from insider sells, and interact each of them
with institutional ownership. Insider purchases are measured by max(NPR, 0), while
insider sells are measured by min(NPR, 0). The regression specification is as follows:
ExReti,t+1→t+k = β1 max(NPRi,t, 0) + β2 min(NPRi,t, 0) + β3 max(NPRi,t, 0) ∗ IO Totali,t
+ β4 min(NPRi,t, 0) ∗ IO Totali,t + β5 max(NPRi,t, 0) ∗ IO Foreigni,t
+ β6 min(NPRi,t, 0) ∗ IO Foreigni,t + β7IO Totali,t + β8IO Foreigni,t
+ Controlsi,t + Controlsi,t ∗NPRi,t + i,t (2)
Table 4 presents the results for one-month excess returns (Column (1)), three-
month excess returns (Column (2)), and six-month excess returns (Column (3)).
Across specifications, we consistently find several patterns. First, insider sells seem to
have stronger predictive power over future stock returns than insider purchases. The
coefficient for min(NPR, 0) is higher than the coefficient for max(NPR, 0). This is
somewhat at odds with previous studies of insider trading in the U.S., which show that
insider purchases are more informative (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)).23 Second, both
domestic and foreign institutional ownership reduce the profitability of insider sells,
but not insider purchases. This is consistent with the notion that insider sales carry
23This difference is mainly attributed to the time-series vs. cross-sectional variation in insider
trades. Our regression uses firm fixed-effects, and large insider sales relative to within-firm average
have strong predictive power over future stock returns. In untabulated analyses, we remove firm
fixed-effects and find that insider purchases have a stronger predictive power than insider sells.
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more litigation risks for insiders and firms (Cheng and Lo (2006); Rogers (2008)).
Finally, foreign institutions have a stronger mitigating effect on the profitability of
insider sells. For example, in Column (1), a 10% increase in domestic institutional
ownership reduces the profitability of min(NPR, 0) by 0.2 percentage points, while
the same magnitude of increase in foreign institutional ownership reduces insider sale
profitability by 1.4 percentage points. The difference is 1.2 percentage points and
highly significant (t = 3.39).
4.3 Identification using MSCI index additions and deletions
A potential concern about the panel regression results is the selection bias: foreign
institutions may prefer firms with certain characteristics, which correlate with insider
trading profitability. For example, Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Leuz, Lins, and
Warnock (2008) show that foreign investors prefer firms with less insider control
and better governance. These firms may be associated with lower insider trading
profitability to begin with.
To alleviate such concerns, we exploit variations in foreign institutional ownership
due to membership changes in Morgan Stanley Capital International All Country
World Index (MSCI ACWI). MSCI ACWI is a commonly used benchmark index for
portfolio managers when investing in foreign countries. Past studies show that a
firm’s foreign institutional ownership increases significantly when added to the MSCI
ACWI (Ferreira and Matos (2008); Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks (2016)). For
a stock to be included in the MSCI ACWI, it has to domicile in a Developed Markets
(DM) country or a Emerging Markets (EM) country.24
The variation of a firm’s MSCI ACWI membership status comes from a firm’s
market capitalization rank within its country. Within each country, MSCI ranks
24Countries not in the Developed Markets or the Emerging Markets are grouped in the Frontier
Markets. The list of the Developed Markets and the Emerging Markets countries remain virtually
constant during our sample period. The only addition to the Emerging Markets between 2000 to
2015, United Arab Emirates, is not in our insider trading data set.
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firms based on their (unadjusted) market capitalization, and include the larger firms
until it covers about 85% of cumulative (free-float) market capitalization in the given
country.25 Bena, Ferreira, Matos, and Pires (2017) show that the foreign institutional
ownership of a firm is sharply lower when a firm’s market capitalization falls below
the 85% cutoff. To take advantage of the exogenous variation in foreign ownership
induced by MSCI ACWI membership, we adopt a difference-in-difference (D-in-D)
methodology around a 20% bandwidth (number of firms) on each side of the MSCI
market cap cutoff in eligible countries. We interact insider trading measure NPR and
a dummy of a firm’s MSCI AWCI membership, while simultaneously controlling for
the interaction between NPR and a firm’s market capitalization. The idea is that,
while unobserved firm characteristics may correlate with insider trading profitability,
their effect on insider trading profitability should be continuous. On the other hand,
MSCI membership should have a distinct impact on insider trading profitability if
foreign institutional ownership has a causal effect.
We first confirm in Table 5, Panel A that foreign institutional ownership increases
significantly when a firm is added to the MSCI index. A dummy variable, MSCIt
takes the value of one if a firm is a member of the MSCI ACWI in year t. The first
column shows the estimates when we regress firms’ foreign institutional ownership on
the MSCI dummy, with firm and country-by-time fixed effects. Foreign institutional
ownership increases by 1.2% to 2.0% when the firm is newly added to the MSCI index,
which is substantial given that the mean and standard deviation of IO Foreign
are 4.09% and 6.93%, respectively. In contrast, domestic institutional ownership
decreases slightly when a firm is in the MSCI.
Next, we examine the impact of MSCI membership on insider trading profitability.
25See “MSCI Global Investable Market Indexes Methodology”, Morgan Stanley Capital Interna-
tional, 2017
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We estimate the following difference-in-differences regression:
ExReti,t+1→t+k = β1NPRi,t + β2NPRi,t ∗MSCIi,t + β3MSCIi,t
+ Controlsi,t + Controlsi,t ∗NPRi,t + i,t (3)
The coefficient of interest is β2, which measures the change in the return pre-
dictability of NPR for treated firms relative to control firms, after a firm is included
in or excluded from the MSCI ACWI. A negative β2 indicates that insider trading
profitability is lower when the firm becomes a member of the MSCI ACWI. Table
5, Panel B suggests that firm’s three-month cumulative excess returns increases by
2.1% (t = 4.61) when NPR increases by one unit. When the firms are included in
the MSCI ACWI, the predictability of NPR decreases by -0.4% (t = 2.12), which is
economically large and statistically significant. The results are consistent when the
dependent variables are the one-month or six-month cumulative excess returns.
Another way of teasing out the causality is to examine the dynamic effect of MSCI
inclusion events on insider trading profitability. If MSCI firms and non-MSCI firms
are inherently different in terms of insider trading, we might expect the reduction in
insider trading profitability to occur before the actual inclusion year. To investigate,
we examine firms’ insider trading profitability for the two years before and the two
years after being included in the MSCI ACWI.
Table 5, Panel C shows the estimation results when estimating separately for
MSCI(t = −1), MSCI(t = −2), MSCI(t = 0), MSCI(t = 1), MSCI(t >= 2), and
their interactions with NPR. MSCI(t = −1) is a dummy variable that equals one for
the first year before the inclusion into MSCI index. MSCI(t = −2), MSCI(t = 0),
and MSCI(t = 1) are similarly defined, where t = 0 refers to the initial inclusion
year. MSCI(t >= 2) is a dummy variable that equals one starting from the second
year after inclusion in the MSCI index, and zero for exclusion years and year 0 and
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1. Panel C of Table 5 shows that the decrease in insider profitability, captured by
the interaction of NPR with MSCI inclusion dummy, occurs only after the stock is
included in MSCI (t=1). The coefficient on t = 0 is insignificant, which is consistent
with the fact that it takes some time for foreign investors to monitor insiders’ activity
and for the monitoring effect to be reflected in the return predictability of NPR.
We plot the coefficient estimates of the interaction terms in Figure 2. The co-
efficients for the interactions of NPR and the MSCI inclusion dummies reflect the
difference in the return predictability of NPR for the treated stocks, and for the con-
trol stocks, surrounding the inclusion in the MSCI ACWI. There is no “pre-trend” in
year t−1 or t−2, reflected in the small and insignificant coefficients for the interaction
terms of NPR with MSCI(t− 1) and MSCI(t− 2). Shortly after the inclusion, the
predictability of treated stocks started to decline and the reduction in predictability
of NPR persists for periods afterwards. Hence, the D-in-D tests suggest that foreign
institutional ownership cause a reduction in insider trading profitability.
4.4 Heterogeneous effects of foreign institutions on insider
trading
While foreign institutional investors can be effective at deterring opportunistic insider
trading, is it substitutable for or complementary to a country’s legal and institutional
environments? On the one hand, foreign institutional investors may require adequate
country-level legal protection to avoid being ripped off by corporate insiders. On the
other hand, the monitoring from foreign institutions may be particularly valuable
in countries where laws and regulations are not well-developed. In this section, we
examine the cross-country variation in the mitigating effect of foreign institutional
ownership.
The legal and institutional environments of a country are multi-dimensional, and
one should not expect their relationship with foreign institutional ownership is uni-
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form across different aspects. Therefore, we split our countries into subsamples based
on a variety of country characteristics: insider trading restrictiveness, legal origin,
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, accounting quality, and au-
diting quality.
Table 6 shows the subsample results based on countries’ insider trading restric-
tiveness, legal origins, and government effectiveness. In the first two columns, we
sort all countries into two groups based on the median cut-off of the blackout, which
is calculated as the difference between the percentage of insider trades that occur
within one month after an earnings announcement and one month before (Brochet
(2017)). The greater the blackout, the more likely corporate insider trades are sub-
ject to timing restrictions and stricter insider trading regulation. The coefficient of
NPR ∗ IO Foreign is -0.039 (t = 2.75) for countries with low blackout values, and
-0.017 (t = 1.96) for high blackout countries. This suggests that the deterring effect of
foreign investors is stronger when the domestic insider trading restrictions are weaker.
Similarly, when we divide the sample by the insider trading restrictiveness measure,
per Du and Wei (2004), in Columns (3) and (4), the results show that a 10% increase
in foreign institutional ownership is associated with a 0.55% (t = 3.24) decrease in
the predictability of NPR for countries with weak insider trading restrictions, but
has no noticeable effect on the predictability of NPR countries with strong insider
trading restrictions.
In Columns (5) and (6), we split sample countries into common law and non-
common law countries. The coefficient of NPR ∗ IO Foreign is -0.035 (t = 2.65) for
non-common law countries and -0.023 (t = 2.53) for common-law countries. Foreign
institutions seems to play a more important role in curbing insider trading in non-
common law countries, which are usually associated with weaker investor protection
(Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)).
In Columns (7) to (12) of Table 6, we group the sample by countries’ governance
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proxies, including government effectiveness, rule of law, and regulatory quality. Con-
sistently, the disciplinary effect of foreign investors is also stronger in countries that
are poorly governed, as identified by the three indicators from the Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011)). The measure
of government effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public ser-
vices, civil service, and policy formulation and implementation. In countries with low
government effectiveness, a 10% increase in IO Foreign reduces the predictability
of NPR by -0.044% (t = 4.24). In contrast, foreign institutional ownership has a
small positive effect on insider trading profitability in countries with high governance
effectiveness. Consistently, foreign investors have a stronger impact of curbing oppor-
tunistic insider trading in countries with weaker rule of law (Columns (9) and (10)).
Finally, the curbing effect of foreign investors is stronger in countries with poorer
regulatory qualities, which captures the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound polices on private sector development.
While most of the proxies we examined suggest that foreign institutional ownership
is a substitute for country-level legal and institutional environment, the relationship
between accounting quality and the effect of foreign institutional ownership is ambigu-
ous. Columns (13) to (14) of Table 6 indicate that an increase in foreign institutional
ownership reduces the profitability of NPR more in countries with low accounting
quality than in countries with high accounting quality. Columns (15) and (16) show
that foreign institutional ownership has similar effect in countries with poor or good
auditing qualities. A potential explanation for the ambiguous relationship is that for-
eign investors rely on accounting information to understand their portfolio companies.
In countries in which companies cook the accounting numbers, foreign institutional
investors face higher information acquisition cost, which reduces the effectiveness of
their monitoring on insider trading.
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4.5 Legal origins of foreign institutional investors and insider
trading profitability
We now analyze the legal origins of foreign institutional investors’ home country,
and how that might influence the mitigation effect of foreign institutions on insider
trading. Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) argue that common-
law countries in general have stronger legal protections for shareholders than civil-law
countries. Accordingly, it is plausible that institutional investors from common-law
countries would tolerate insider trading less and monitor corporate insiders more
forcefully. Therefore, we should expect heterogeneous effects of foreign institutions
on insider trading based on the legal origins of foreign institutions’ home countries.
To empirically investigate this hypothesis, we decompose foreign institutional own-
ership into two components: foreign institutional ownership from civil-law countries
(IO Foreign(Civil)) and foreign institutional ownership from common-law countries
(IO Foreign(Common)). Each variable interacts with NPR to predict future stock
returns:
ExReti,t+1→t+k = β1NPRi,t + β2NPRi,t ∗ IO Totali,t + β3NPRi,t ∗ IO Foreign(Civil)i,t
+ β4NPRi,t ∗ IO Foreign(Common)i,t + β5IO Totali,t + β6IO Foreign(Civil)i,t
+ β7IO Foreign(Common)i,t + Controlsi,t + Controlsi,t ∗NPRi,t + i,t (4)
Table 7 shows the results. Across different return horizons, foreign institutional
investors from common-law countries seem to consistently reduce the profitability
of insider trading more effectively than foreign institutions from civil-law countries
do, when both are benchmarked against domestic institutional investors. For ex-
ample, for three-month excess returns (Column (2)), the interaction between NPR
and IO Total is -0.004, indicating that a 10% increase in domestic institutional
ownership reduces excess returns of NPR by 0.04 percentage points. The interac-
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tion between NPR and IO Foreign(Common) is -0.022 and statistically significant,
suggesting that an increase of the same magnitude in foreign institutional owner-
ship (from common-law countries) reduces insider profits by 0.26 percentage points
(10% ∗ (−0.004− 0.022)). The incremental power of common-law foreign institutions
is statistically significant.
At the same time, the interaction between NPR and IO Foreign(Civil) is neg-
ative but insignificant. While the point estimate for this interaction is similar to the
point estimate for the interaction term with IO Foreign(Common), a higher level
of foreign institutional ownership from civil-law countries does not reliably reduce
the profitability of insider trading above and beyond the effect of institutional own-
ership in general. The contrast between the mitigating effect of foreign institutions
from common-law countries and that of foreign institutions from civil-law countries
suggests that the legal origins of foreign investors are important in curbing insider
trading.
5 Channels
Foreign investors can curb opportunistic insider trading through two non-mutually
exclusive channels. First, foreign investors might improve firms’ information environ-
ments and price efficiency by, for example, attracting more sell-side analysts to cover
the firm. This reduces the information asymmetry between corporate insiders and
outside investors, thereby reducing insider profits — the information channel. Sec-
ond, foreign investors could directly monitor the top managers of a firm and actively
manage litigation risks. These activities deter insiders from trading when their infor-
mation is most sensitive, hence reducing the average profitability of insider trades —
the monitoring channel. In this section, we conduct empirical analyses to disentangle
the two channels.
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5.1 Controlling for firms’ information environments
Past and contemporaneous papers have shown that institutional ownership increases
price efficiency, both in the U.S. and worldwide (Boehmer and Kelley (2009); Kacper-
czyk, Sundaresan, and Wang (2018)). To the extent that a better information en-
vironment impounds private information into stock prices more quickly and reduces
insiders’ information advantage, foreign institutional holdings may alleviate insider
profitability.
We measure a firm’s information environment using four different proxies. First,
we use the number of analysts following a firm’s stock. The more analysts following a
firm, the better a firm’s information environment (Lang, Lins, and Maffett (2012)). To
account for the positive skewness of analyst coverage, we transform the variable into
Ln(Analyst coverage+1). Second, we use the dispersion of analyst forecasts, whereas
a larger forecast dispersion indicates a worse information environment.26 Third, we
use analyst forecast error, which is defined as the absolute value of the difference
between the consensus EPS forecast and the actual EPS, scaled by the actual EPS.
We assume that firms with a smaller forecast error have a better information envi-
ronment. Finally, we use price non-synchronicity, as described in Chen, Goldstein,
and Jiang (2006), to measure the amount of firm-specific information in stock prices.
Higher price non-synchronicity indicates more informative stock prices and a better
information environment.27 All information environment proxies are measured one
period before the insider trading is measured.28
For each proxy, we estimate the baseline regressions controlling for both the in-
formation environment and the interaction between the information environment and
26It should be noted that a firm must have at least two analysts to have a valid forecast dispersion
measure, which limits the sample size when we use the forecast dispersion variable.
27Papers that use firm-specific return variation as a measure for price informativeness include
Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2006), Jin and Myers (2006), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008).
28This is to take into account that some of the market-based information environment proxies (for
example, price synchronicity) can be directly influenced by contemporaneous insider trading.
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insider NPR.
ExReti,t+1→t+k = β1NPRi,t + β2NPRi,t ∗ IO Totali,t + β3NPRi,t ∗ IO Foreigni,t
+ β4IO Totali,t + β5IO Foreigni,t + β6InformationEnvi,t−1 ∗NPRi,t
+ β7InformationEnvi,t−1 + Controlsi,t + Controlsi,t ∗NPRi,t + i,t (5)
Table 8 shows the results. Since the size of samples with available information-
environment proxy varies, for each proxy we show the results both with and without
information-environment controls in order to compare the coefficients on NPR ∗
IO Foreign. In Columns (1) and (2), we use analyst coverage as the proxy for in-
formation environment, and Column (2) controls for the interaction between insider
NPR and Ln(Analyst coverage + 1). From Column (1) to Column (2), the coeffi-
cient on NPR ∗ IO Foreign slightly decreases from -0.023 to -0.021, but remains
significantly negative when the information environment is controlled for. The small
change suggests that the major part of the mitigating power of foreign institutional
ownership is not derived from the information environment channel. It is also notable
that, in Column (2), the interaction between NPR and analyst coverage is signifi-
cantly negative. This suggests that a better information environment also reduces
the profitability of insider trading, but through a different channel.
Columns (3) and (4) use analyst forecast dispersion as the measure for informa-
tion environment. Comparing Column (4) and Column (3), and controlling for the
interaction between NPR and forecast dispersion, the mitigating power of foreign in-
stitutional ownership stays unchanged at -0.024. At the same time, a higher forecast
dispersion independently correlate with higher insider trading profits. In Columns (5)
and (6) of Table 8, we use absolute forecast errors to proxy for stocks’ information
environments. The coefficient on NPR ∗ IO Foreign across the two columns shows
that the information environment does not affect the mitigating power of foreign in-
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stitutional ownership. Finally, using price non-synchronicity (Columns (7) and (8))
as the measure for information environment, we find that the mitigating effect of
foreign institutional ownership on insider trading profitability is unchanged.
The evidence presented in this section suggests that the mitigation effect of foreign
institutional ownership found in our baseline regressions is unlikely to operate through
the information channel.
5.2 The distribution of insider trades
If foreign institutional ownership affects insider profitability through the monitoring
channel, corporate insiders should alter their trading patterns in response to increased
foreign institutional ownership. In this section, we directly examine the distribution
of insider trades in relation to foreign institutional holdings. Our hypothesis is that
insider trades shift in a way that reduces the information content of an average insider
trade. In particular, we examine the size and frequency of insider trades, the direction
of these trades, and the timing of insider trades in relation to earnings announcements.
In Columns (1) to (3) of Table 9, we first examine how the total number of trans-
actions (Log(#Trades)), the average transaction size per trade (Log(V alue)), and
the total transaction value (Log(Total V alue)) change with respect to change in for-
eign institutional ownership. Column (1) suggests that a 10% increase in IO Foreign
is associated with an insignificant 1.77% (t = 1.51) increase in the total number of
insider trades for a firm within a year. Accompanying the insignificant change in
total transaction number is the reduction in the average size of transactions. Col-
umn (2) suggests that each transaction size, calculated as transaction shares times
the stock price (in EUR) decreases by -5.79% (t = 3.19) when foreign institutional
ownership increases by 10%. In combination, the total insider transaction value de-
creases slightly by -4.63%(t = 1.94). Hence, the results suggest that insiders split
their transactions to trade in a smaller amount when foreign institutional ownership
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increases, potentially to avoid the scrutiny from foreign shareholders. The evidence
is consistent with findings in prior literature that insiders trade less opportunistically
in periods characterized by a higher intensity of enforcement (Cohen, Malloy, and
Pomorski (2012); Del Guercio, Odders-White, and Ready (2017)).
In Columns (4) and (5) of Table 9, we examine how the composition of buy and
sell transactions change when IO Foreign changes. We measure the fraction of sell
transactions using both the number of sell transactions over total insider transac-
tions (Sell(#)Fraction) and the dollar value of sells over total dollar value of insider
trades (Sell(V alue)Fraction). Insiders trade more cautiously by reducing the sells
substantially after foreign institutional ownership increases. The sells number frac-
tion decreases by 1.55% (t = 3.53) and the sells dollar fraction decreases by 1.96%
(t = 4.12) when foreign institutional ownership increases by 10%. This is consistent
with the argument that insider sales carry more litigation risks for insiders (Rogers
(2008)).
In addition, the cautiousness of insiders may also be reflected in the timing of their
trades. Column (6) and (7) of Table 9 examine the fraction of insider trades that oc-
cur in the one month after the earnings announcement date. This period is supposed
to be the least information-sensitive period with respect to insider trading, as trad-
ing right after an earnings announcement usually indicates the existence of blackout
period policies. We also control for the informativeness of earnings announcement by
including the absolute earnings announcement returns (CAR[-10,2]) averaged over the
following year. Hence, the results are unlikely driven by the changing informativeness
of earnings when foreign institutional ownership increases (Kacperczyk, Sundaresan,
and Wang (2018)). Consistent with the hypothesis that insiders change trading be-
havior under the pressure of foreign institutions, the fraction of insider trades after
earnings announcements increases by 1.08% when foreign institutional ownership in-
creases by 10%. This finding suggests that insiders adjust their timing of trades due
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to either firm-level policy change or insiders’ voluntary behaviors. It is consistent
with the monitoring channel, but is not predicted by the information channel.
5.3 Top-tier vs. lower-tier insiders
Another implication from the monitoring channel is that foreign institutional own-
ership should reduce the profitability of trades made by top-tier insiders more than
that of trades made by lower-tier insiders. First, institutional investors tend to have
direct communication with executives and board members. Second, the potential
litigation risks and reputation losses are larger for these top managers. In contrast,
if the mitigating effect of foreign ownership operates mainly through the information
channel, it is unclear which insiders should lose more profitability.
To test this hypothesis, we construct insider NPR based on top-tier insiders’
trades and lower-tier insiders’ trade separately. Following 2iQ, top-tier insiders (in-
sider level of A) are defined as the executive board, chairman, and top-five share-
holders of the firms. We then regress firms’ future three-month excess returns on
NPR(Top), NPR(Low), and their interactions with IO and IO Foreign.
Table 10 shows that the trades of both top- and lower-tier insiders’ are posi-
tive in predicting future stock returns. When NPR(Top) increases by one unit, it
predicts that the future three-month excess return will increase by 0.7% (Column
(2)). Similarly, a one unit increase in NPR(Low) is associated with exactly the same
amount of future-return changes. The coefficient on NPR(TOP ) ∗ IO Foreign is
-0.026 (t = 3.85), indicating that the insider trading profitability decreases by an
extra 0.26% when foreign institutional ownership increase by 10%. The same mag-
nitude of increase in foreign institutional ownership only reduce the profitability of
NPR(Low) by 0.14%, about half the amount of the top insiders’ trades. The re-
sults of using dependent variables of one-month and six-month excess returns are
also consistent.
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Taken together, the analysis, by decomposing insider trades into top and low
tier insiders, shows that the monitoring effect of foreign institutional investors comes
mostly from monitoring of top-tier corporate insiders.
6 Robustness Tests
In this section, we conduct several additional tests to check the robustness of our
findings and rule out several alternative explanations. In each case, we find that
foreign institutional ownership significantly reduces the profitability of insider trading.
In Table A4, we run the baseline regression on a subsample of firms that are
domiciled outside the U.S. For one-, three-, or six-month future excess return, the
coefficient on NPR ∗ IO Foreign is significantly negative, while the interaction term
NPR∗IO Total is not distinguishable from zero. This indicates that, for the non-US
subsample, foreign institutional ownership lowers the profitability of insider trading,
whereas domestic institutional ownership does not curb insider trading.
In Table A5, we control for the cross-listing status of stocks in our sample. When-
ever a stock is cross-listed in overseas exchanges, we assign a dummy variable GDR
equal to 1. Cross-listed stocks may be subject to more stringent regulatory oversight
and disclosure requirements from the stock exchange abroad (Doidge, Karolyi, and
Stulz (2004)). As these cross-listed stocks tend to have higher foreign institutional
ownership, this may explain our findings. In Table A5, we include an additional in-
teraction term NPR∗GDR in the baseline specification, and find that the mitigating
effect of foreign institutional ownership is still robust and statistically significant.
In Table A6, we investigate another potential channel through which foreign in-
stitutional ownership may affect insider trading profitability. Wei (2010) and Ng,
Wu, Yu, and Zhang (2015) suggest that foreign institutional ownership improves the
liquidity of a stock. While standard theories and empirical evidence29 suggest that
29See, for example, Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015).
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an increase in stock liquidity drives insiders to trade more aggressively on private
information and leads to an underestimation of our result, we empirically test the
robustness of our findings by directly controlling for stock liquidity. We use two stock
liquidity measures: the first measure (“Amihud illiquidity”) follows Amihud (2002),
and the second measure (“fraction of zero return”) follows Lesmond (2005). The
baseline specification includes the liquidity measure and an interaction term between
NPR and the liquidity measure. Columns (1) to (3) of Table A6 shows that, control-
ling for stock (il)liquidity, foreign institutional ownership still significantly reduces
the profitability of insider trading. In addition, using the fraction of zero return days,
we find that insider trading profits are higher when a stock is more liquid. Further-
more, in Column (4), we control for the interaction between the average daily return
volatility of stocks and NPR. The results suggest that the mitigating power of foreign
institutional ownership is unaffected by controlling for return volatility.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the relation between foreign institutional ownership and
the profitability of insider trades. We find that higher foreign institutional owner-
ship significantly reduces insider trading profitability, above and beyond the effect of
domestic institutional ownership. This suggests that foreign investors play an impor-
tant role in mitigating the adverse impact of insider trading, especially in countries
with weak legal and institutional environments. The effect of foreign institutional
ownership is plausibly causal using variations induced by MSCI ACWI additions and
deletions. The mitigation effect of foreign institutional ownership has two plausible
channels: the information channel and the monitoring channel. We present evidence
that it is more likely that foreign institutions curb insider trading by directly moni-
toring insiders’ illicit behavior.
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Beyond providing the first empirical analysis of cross-country firm-level insider
trading, our findings have broader implications. For example, previous studies doc-
ument the positive effect of foreign institutional investors on the quality of financial
markets, including liquidity (Ng, Wu, Yu, and Zhang (2015)) and price efficiency
(Kacperczyk, Sundaresan, and Wang (2018)). However, the precise channel through
which foreign investors improve the efficiency of the stock market is unclear. Because
there are clear theoretical arguments and empirical evidence linking insider trading
with price efficiency and liquidity, restricting insider trading could well be the under-
lying channel through which foreign investors make an impact on financial markets.
We leave these topics for future research.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics for insider trades by each country. We include insiders of executives, chairman, and board of directors (Insiderlevel of A, 
B, C, D). We include regular market transactions, and exclude private placement and private transactions. Multiple trades by the same insider of the same firm in 
one single day are counted as one trade. We include countries that have insider trades before 2012 and total number of insider buy and sell trades to be large than 
1000. Panel A shows the total number of trades (‘000), mean and median of each trade size (shares and value in EUR, in thousands) for each country. In the last 
two columns, we include the monthly average of country-level insider trading volume, out of total dollar trading volume and market capitalization. Panel B shows 
the summary statistics for insider and firms, by country. # unique insiders (firms) denotes the total number of unique insiders and firms with insider trades coverage 
in our entire sample. # firms/total represents the number of the firms with insider trades out of total number of listed firms in the country. Similarly, Size firms/total 
denotes the size fraction of firms with insider trades out of the total market capitalization of the country. We also include the mean and median number of trades 
made by each insider and firm. Panel C shows the summary statistics of the variables in our sample. NPR is insiders’ net purchase ratio calculated as the number 
of purchases minus the number of sells, divided by total number of transactions for the past six month periods. IO_Total is the total institutional ownership of the 
firm, and IO_Foreign is the foreign institutional ownership of the firm. We further include IO_Foreign(Common) and IO_Foreign(Civil) that represent the 
ownership by foreign institutions with common or civil law of origin. NPR(Top) is the insider net purchase ratio constructed only using top insiders’ trades (insider 
level of A). NPR(Low) is the insider net purchase ratios calculated using lower tier insiders’ trades, which include insiders of level B, C and D. Other variables 
include past one month return, past twelve months return, natural logarithm of firm’s market capitalization (USD), and book to market (B/M) ratio.  
 
Panel A: Distribution of insider trades, by country  
  Buy  Sell  Trading volume (%) 
   Shares ('000) Value (EUR, '000)   Shares ('000) Value (EUR, '000)  
Insider/
Vol 
Insider/
Mktcap 
Country/Region Start 
# trade 
('000) 
Mean Median Mean Median  
# trade 
('000) 
Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Mean 
Australia 
 
2002 38.3 1,693.5 63.5 14,491.3 16.7  7.4 1,533.7 200.0 20,825.5 172.8  0.219 0.011 
Belgium 2006 2.0 45.3 2.5 695.3 52.5  2.7 41.4 5.0 1,293.7 139.2  0.428 0.015 
Canada 2002 150.0 51.4 10.0 229.5 5.4  151.3 57.6 11.4 344.1 37.7  0.302 0.018 
China 2006 18.5 186.6 11.1 322.5 19.3  36.1 550.5 40.4 1,156.3 87.5  0.083 0.022 
Denmark 2007 3.5 706.2 1.8 917.5 22.6  1.5 1,924.4 5.6 5,174.3 130.6  0.803 0.051 
Finland 2007 6.1 132.5 2.0 234.9 11.6  5.0 53.1 3.0 139.2 13.9  0.470 0.039 
France 2005 10.6 131.8 1.6 1,686.4 24.0  11.0 46.9 6.0 1,375.9 163.9  0.246 0.016 
Germany 2002 12.5 274.3 4.0 729.1 33.4  6.6 152.7 10.0 4,671.4 149.5  0.135 0.014 
Greece 2005 22.6 85.4 3.4 211.4 6.1  8.0 124.3 5.0 530.7 24.5  0.779 0.038 
Hong Kong 2003 47.1 25,190.7 400.0 2,002.3 54.8  22.0 32,746.5 560.0 4,184.9 137.3  2.404 0.133 
India 2007 9.8 154.7 12.0 241.0 16.9  33.1 66.1 3.0 203.7 24.9  0.276 0.016 
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Italy 2003 12.9 537.2 10.3 669.2 36.6  8.2 386.2 20.0 1,110.3 113.1  0.190 0.025 
Malaysia 2005 20.1 1,608.2 100.0 361.8 22.2  15.4 1,932.8 100.0 424.3 39.1  2.167 0.052 
Netherlands 2001 2.6 114.4 2.9 684.9 31.9  4.3 64.8 6.4 976.9 127.9  0.151 0.011 
Norway 2005 8.3 514.0 10.0 424.2 21.2  3.3 295.4 19.1 738.3 114.9  0.353 0.019 
Philippines 2006 4.6 4,613.1 40.0 346.5 9.0  4.2 9,792.4 50.0 600.1 18.0  1.568 0.025 
Poland 2007 3.6 434.1 6.6 254.2 14.4  2.5 183.1 7.4 399.5 37.9  0.788 0.027 
Singapore 2000 8.5 7,854.5 166.0 2,523.0 43.9  2.8 5,866.3 196.0 1,899.6 92.5  1.571 0.076 
South Africa 2005 4.1 487.8 26.0 234.6 17.5  6.2 323.1 30.0 483.9 89.7  0.339 0.012 
South Korea 2000 32.9 478.0 5.6 1,089.2 30.0  20.3 282.1 10.0 1,072.2 83.9  0.598 0.113 
Spain 2006 6.7 314.2 5.4 1,253.2 39.1  2.3 394.0 9.9 2,748.8 89.3  0.118 0.015 
Sweden 2004 21.4 167.8 3.2 289.3 12.3  10.2 157.6 6.4 564.2 38.0  0.235 0.018 
Switzerland 2005 6.9 25.9 1.0 569.4 52.1  10.0 39.1 2.2 1,638.7 165.5  1.674 0.110 
Thailand 2000 25.8 1,551.9 50.0 139.2 8.7  23.6 2,264.7 80.0 210.0 17.4  0.687 0.040 
USA 2000 190.8 375.9 2.5 749.1 15.0  543.9 76.2 8.6 924.0 169.7  0.161 0.023 
United Kingdom 2003 36.3 662.3 20.0 338.3 27.6  22.2 247.4 38.4 968.6 243.3  0.667 0.025 
 
 
Panel B. Trades, by insiders and firms  
     # trades per insider   # insiders per firm   # trades per firm  
Country/Region 
# of unique 
insiders  
# of unique 
firms  
# firms/total 
Size 
firms/total 
Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
Australia 10050 2015 63.05 98.02 5 2  6 5  23 16 
Belgium 1058 141 42.22 97.50 4 2  8 6  34 19 
Canada 43341 4665 81.10 99.27 7 3  10 7  65 33 
China 15982 2326 81.41 80.42 3 2  7 6  23 13 
Denmark 1821 243 66.94 97.22 3 2  8 6  21 13 
Finland 1707 149 63.68 99.75 7 2  13 12  75 53 
France 4021 737 40.10 95.79 5 2  6 4  29 15 
Germany 4365 817 42.24 90.16 4 2  6 4  23 13 
Greece 2392 294 70.33 97.17 13 3  8 4  104 41.5 
Hong Kong 7055 1642 81.41 85.69 10 3  5 4  42 19 
India 9625 1017 24.11 78.32 4 2  10 2  42 7 
Italy 3384 371 57.08 98.73 6 2  10 6  57 31 
Malaysia 4456 909 69.50 93.67 8 3  5 4  39 14 
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Netherlands 1905 238 60.71 90.41 4 2  8 4  29 12.5 
Norway 4273 392 77.32 99.76 3 2  12 9  30 18.5 
Philippines 1482 196 61.06 92.93 6 2  8 4  45 11 
Poland 1444 393 46.90 96.21 4 2  4 3  16 7 
Singapore 2161 558 52.30 96.24 5 2  4 3  20 8 
South Africa 2664 378 36.73 98.94 4 2  7 6  27 15 
South Korea 18700 2308 84.85 98.85 3 2  8 6  23 13 
Spain 1706 182 47.52 99.19 5 2  10 7  49 25 
Sweden 8828 666 68.17 99.41 4 2  15 10  48 26 
Switzerland 650 289 64.51 99.28 26 9  2 2  59 33 
Thailand 5474 656 70.92 96.86 9 3  9 7  75 33 
USA 98501 11131 60.55 98.70 7 3  11 8  66 28 
United Kingdom 17874 2844 48.18 97.99 3 2   7 5   21 10 
Panel C: Summary Statistics for Variables 
Variable N Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. 
NPR 1633732 -0.027 0.000 -0.913 0.667 0.727 
NPR (Require NPR ≠0) 1019261 -0.043 -0.333 -1.000 1.000 0.920 
IO_Total 1633732 22.95% 8.57% 0.07% 35.14% 30.01% 
IO_Foreign 1633732 4.09% 0.71% 0.00% 5.19% 6.93% 
IO_Foreign (Common) 1633732 2.79% 0.32% 0.00% 3.01% 5.28% 
IO_Foreign (Civil) 1633732 1.24% 0.05% 0.00% 1.43% 2.30% 
Past month return 1633732 1.24% 0.36% -6.24% 7.20% 15.95% 
Past 12 months return 1633732 20.66% 7.72% -20.97% 40.41% 86.10% 
Log(Size) 1633732 6.591 6.475 4.751 8.257 2.536 
B/M 1633732 0.891 0.595 0.291 1.095 0.989 
Governance 332490 0.756 0.75 0.688 0.812 0.119 
Governance Rank 332490 0.507 0.508 0.258 0.757 0.288 
Log(Analyst coverage+1) 1618431 0.993 0.693 0.000 1.945 1.109 
Forecast dispersion 828697 0.203 0.083 0.039 0.190 0.361 
Forecast error 839524 0.499 0.111 0.036 0.352 1.343 
Price non-synchronicity 1501543 0.814 0.881 0.698 0.985 0.197 
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Table 2. Return predictability of insider trades: Portfolio Analysis 
This table reports the returns and alphas for the long-short portfolio formed on firms’ six-months net purchase ratio 
(NPR). Net purchase ratio is calculated following Laknishok and Lee (2001). Each month, we sort firms within each 
country into quintiles based on the NPR of previous six month. We form equal-weighted portfolios by longing the top 
quintile and short the bottom quintile stocks, and hold for three months. The table shows the monthly returns and 
alphas (in percentage) of the long-short portfolio for each country. Portfolio alpha is estimated using global five factors 
and regional five factors following Fama and French (2015). For US, the alpha is estimated using US five factors. The 
overall sample period is from 2000 to 2015. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
Calendar-time portfolio returns and alphas 
 Raw return   Alpha  
Country/Region Buy Sell Buy-Sell  t-stat   Buy Sell Buy-Sell tstat  
Thailand 2.41 0.93 1.48 (6.00)***  0.56 -0.17 0.73 (5.66)*** 
Canada 2.26 0.82 1.44 (6.20)***  0.71 0.18 0.53 (4.25)*** 
South Korea 1.67 0.31 1.35 (6.87)***  0.56 -0.06 0.62 (5.06)*** 
USA 2.52 1.19 1.33 (2.86)***  0.75 0.38 0.37 (1.93)* 
Greece 0.18 -1.14 1.32 (2.37)**  0.11 -0.51 0.62 (2.14)** 
India 2.30 1.16 1.13 (4.08)***  0.79 0.19 0.60 (3.91)*** 
Poland 0.47 -0.57 1.04 (3.18)***  0.34 -0.25 0.59 (2.68)*** 
Australia 2.16 1.19 0.97 (4.07)***  0.64 0.12 0.52 (4.64)*** 
Germany 1.54 0.61 0.93 (1.77)*  0.58 0.35 0.23 (1.02) 
South Africa 1.22 0.42 0.80 (2.54)**  0.18 -0.21 0.40 (1.97)* 
Malaysia 1.68 0.89 0.79 (4.90)***  0.46 0.06 0.39 (4.49)*** 
Sweden 1.54 0.76 0.78 (4.29)***  0.48 0.07 0.41 (4.29)*** 
Switzerland 1.31 0.54 0.76 (3.59)***  0.54 0.08 0.45 (4.15)*** 
France 1.15 0.51 0.64 (2.75)***  0.29 -0.10 0.38 (3.76)*** 
Philippines 2.59 2.06 0.53 (0.97)  0.77 0.57 0.20 (0.76) 
Belgium 0.89 0.36 0.53 (1.06)  0.27 -0.06 0.33 (0.82) 
Netherlands 1.09 0.64 0.45 (1.47)  0.37 0.03 0.35 (2.24)** 
Singapore 1.34 0.88 0.45 (1.74)*  0.09 -0.18 0.27 (1.78)* 
Italy 0.84 0.40 0.44 (1.93)*  -0.06 -0.29 0.24 (1.72)* 
Norway 0.44 0.13 0.31 (1.03)  0.03 -0.31 0.34 (2.03)** 
Hong Kong 1.87 1.58 0.28 (1.10)  0.36 0.24 0.12 (0.90) 
Denmark 0.12 -0.13 0.26 (0.75)  -0.07 -0.18 0.11 (0.63) 
China 3.31 3.07 0.24 (0.95)  1.76 1.62 0.14 (1.05) 
Finland 0.54 0.38 0.16 (0.48)  0.19 -0.03 0.23 (1.34) 
Spain 0.02 -0.04 0.06 (0.21)  -0.03 -0.07 0.05 (0.27) 
United Kingdom 1.11 1.09 0.02 (0.13)  0.21 0.15 0.06 (0.55) 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239075 
 
 
 
Table 3. Foreign institutional ownership and insider trading profitability  
This table reports the panel regression results of the effect of foreign institutional ownership on insider trading 
profitability. The dependent variable is future 1, 3, and 6 months cumulative excess returns. Cumulative excess return 
is calculated as the cumulative raw return in excess of the corresponding country’s market return. Control variables 
include past one month and past 12 months returns, the natural logarithm of stocks’ market capitalization, book-to-
market ratio (B/M) in Columns (2), (4), (6), (8). In Columns (7) and (8), we further control for the percentile rank of 
corporate governance index and its interaction with NPR. Corporate governance index is constructed using risk metrics 
data following Albuquerque et al., (2018). All models include firm and country*time fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The sample period is from 2000 to 2015. 
 
 
Whole Sample 
Sample with 
governance index 
 Cum 1 month Cum 3 months Cum 6 months Cum 3 month 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NPR 0.006 0.005 0.015 0.011 0.027 0.019 0.010 0.011 
 (26.62)*** (8.03)*** (24.63)*** (7.03)*** (22.94)*** (6.61)*** (2.19)** (2.47)** 
NPR*IO_Total 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.008 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 
 (1.56) (2.17)** (1.95)* (2.23)** (2.71)*** (2.15)** (0.58) (0.42) 
NPR*IO_Foreign -0.010 -0.008 -0.029 -0.023 -0.053 -0.042 -0.033 -0.032 
 (4.82)*** (3.45)*** (5.10)*** (3.69)*** (5.11)*** (3.66)*** (3.02)*** (2.94)*** 
IO_Total -0.039 -0.008 -0.120 -0.023 -0.225 -0.033 -0.050 -0.050 
 (20.15)*** (3.77)*** (20.45)*** (3.86)*** (19.68)*** (2.85)*** (4.01)*** (4.03)*** 
IO_Foreign -0.057 -0.015 -0.183 -0.057 -0.386 -0.136 -0.045 -0.045 
 (13.55)*** (3.31)*** (14.27)*** (4.12)*** (15.22)*** (5.09)*** (1.74)* (1.73)* 
Past month return  -0.027  -0.024  -0.020 -0.017 -0.017 
  (25.76)***  (13.85)***  (8.62)*** (4.25)*** (4.27)*** 
Past 12 months return  0.004  0.007  0.011 0.007 0.007 
  (13.69)***  (11.48)***  (10.32)*** (4.72)*** (4.73)*** 
Log(Size)  -0.022  -0.065  -0.131 -0.080 -0.080 
  (59.52)***  (61.64)***  (64.04)*** (19.97)*** (19.94)*** 
B/M  0.002  0.007  0.011 0.004 0.004 
  (8.01)***  (9.15)***  (6.98)*** (1.56) (1.56) 
NPR*Past month return  0.001  0.002  0.007 0.017 0.017 
  (0.59)  (0.91)  (2.41)** (4.01)*** (4.01)*** 
NPR*Past 12 month return  0.002  0.005  0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
  (7.09)***  (7.79)***  (6.90)*** (0.53) (0.56) 
NPR*Log(Size)  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
  (2.05)**  (1.92)*  (2.12)** (0.97) (0.81) 
NPR*B/M  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.002 0.002 
  (1.22)  (0.67)  (0.11) (1.57) (1.60) 
Governance        -0.005 
        (1.77)* 
NPR*Governance        0.002 
        (0.68) 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country*time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.18 
N 1,618,431 1,618,431 1,618,431 1,618,431 1,618,431 1,618,431 307,859 307,859 
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Table 4. Insider purchases and sales  
This table reports the panel regression results of the effect of foreign institutional ownership on the profitability of 
insider purchases and sales. We decompose NPR into positive NPR, constructed as Max(NPR, 0) and negative NPR 
constructed as Min(NPR, 0). Max(NPR, 0) equals NPR for positive NPR, and zero otherwise, and similarly for 
Min(NPR, 0). The dependent variable is future 1, 3, and 6 months cumulative excess returns. Control variables include 
past one month and past 12 months returns, the natural logarithm of stocks’ market capitalization, and book-to-market 
ratio (B/M). All models include firm and country*time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is from 2000 
to 2015. 
 
 Cumulative 1 month Cumulative 3 months Cumulative 6 months 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Max(NPR, 0) 0.005 0.011 0.016 
 (7.57)*** (6.15)*** (5.04)*** 
Min(NPR, 0) 0.004 0.011 0.023 
 (5.66)*** (5.90)*** (6.69)*** 
Max(NPR, 0)*IO_Total 0.000 0.002 0.008 
 (0.20) (0.48) (1.43) 
Min(NPR, 0)*IO_Total -0.002 -0.007 -0.017 
 (1.97)** (2.67)*** (3.74)*** 
Max(NPR, 0)*IO_Foreign -0.005 -0.012 -0.004 
 (1.11) (1.05) (0.23) 
Min(NPR, 0)*IO_Foreign -0.012 -0.037 -0.082 
 (3.39)*** (3.88)*** (4.80)*** 
IO_Total -0.008 -0.026 -0.040 
 (3.95)*** (4.18)*** (3.45)*** 
IO_Foreign -0.018 -0.064 -0.159 
 (3.53)*** (4.38)*** (5.63)*** 
Past month return -0.027 -0.024 -0.020 
 (25.76)*** (13.85)*** (8.63)*** 
Past 12 months return 0.004 0.007 0.011 
 (13.70)*** (11.49)*** (10.35)*** 
Log(Size) -0.022 -0.065 -0.130 
 (59.57)*** (61.64)*** (64.00)*** 
B/M 0.002 0.007 0.011 
 (8.05)*** (9.16)*** (6.97)*** 
NPR*Past month return 0.001 0.002 0.007 
 (0.55) (0.88) (2.41)** 
NPR*Past 12 month return 0.002 0.005 0.007 
 (7.32)*** (7.89)*** (6.91)*** 
NPR*Log(Size) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (1.61) (1.74)* (2.15)** 
NPR*B/M 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.95) (0.57) (0.13) 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Country*time FE Y Y Y 
R2 0.09 0.14 0.20 
N 1,618,431 1,618,431 1,618,431 
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Table 5. Identification using MSCI index inclusion and exclusion 
This table reports results from estimating difference-in-differences regression models of institutional ownership and 
insider trading profitability around the year a stock is added to or excluded from the MSCI ACWI. MSCI is a dummy 
that equals one when the firm is included in the MSCI index in that year. The sample is restricted to firms in the 20% 
bandwidth of the number of stocks around the MSCI ACWI cutoff point in each country. Panel A shows the results 
with foreign and domestic institutional ownership as dependent variables. Panel B shows the effect of MSCI index 
inclusion and exclusion on insider trading profitability. Panel C shows the results when controlling for MSCI(t=-1), 
MSCI(t=-2), MSCI(t=0), MSCI(t=1), MSCI(t>=2), and their interactions with NPR. MSCI(t=-1) is a dummy variable 
that equals one for the first year before the inclusion into MSCI index. Similarly, MSCI(t=-2), MSCI(t=0), MSCI(t=1) 
are dummy variables that equals one for the second year before inclusion, the year of inclusion, and the first year after 
inclusion into the MSCI index respectively. MSCI(t>=2) equals one for the second year after inclusion and for the 
remaining years when the stock stays in the MSCI index. All models include firm and Country*time fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: MSCI and Institutional Ownership 
 Foreign IO Domestic IO 
MSCI 0.020 0.012 -0.002 -0.008 
 (14.30)*** (8.84)*** (0.95) (3.22)*** 
Past month return  -0.012  -0.011 
  (17.86)***  (11.68)*** 
Past 12 months return  -0.003  -0.001 
  (8.08)***  (1.97)** 
Log(Size)  0.013  0.010 
  (17.92)***  (7.28)*** 
B/M  -0.001  0.000 
  (0.80)  (0.00) 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Country*Time FE Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.86 0.86 0.97 0.97 
N 597,854      597,854 597,854 597,854 
 
Panel B. MSCI and insider trading profitability 
 Cumulative 1 month Cumulative 3 months Cumulative 6 months 
NPR 0.007 0.021 0.053 
 (4.39)*** (4.61)*** (5.44)*** 
NPR*MSCI -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 
 (1.51) (2.12)** (2.07)** 
MSCI 0.017 0.046 0.077 
 (16.27)*** (13.56)*** (9.68)*** 
Past month return 0.003 0.018 0.024 
 (0.96) (2.61)*** (2.02)** 
Past 12 months return 0.000 -0.004 -0.015 
 (0.95) (2.81)*** (4.05)*** 
Log(Size) -0.043 -0.132 -0.268 
 (47.79)*** (36.78)*** (25.88)*** 
B/M 0.003 0.012 0.019 
 (4.77)*** (5.58)*** (4.25)*** 
NPR*Past month return 0.006 -0.004 0.001 
 (2.21)** (0.91) (0.11) 
NPR*Past 12 month return 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (1.12) (1.13) (0.42) 
NPR*Log(Size) -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 
 (3.56)*** (4.12)*** (5.14)*** 
NPR*B/M 0.001 0.004 0.009 
 (3.71)*** (3.68)*** (3.90)*** 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
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Country*time FE Y Y Y 
R2 0.17 0.25 0.32 
N 593,908 593,908 593,908 
 
Panel C. Pre-MSCI inclusion and insider trading profitability 
 Cumulative 1 month Cumulative 3 months Cumulative 6 months 
NPR 0.006 0.019 0.049 
 (3.73)*** (4.02)*** (4.97)*** 
NPR*MSCI(t=-2) -0.001 0.002 0.021 
 (0.35) (0.45) (1.80)* 
NPR*MSCI(t=-1) 0.001 0.010 0.027 
 (0.68) (1.73)* (2.49)** 
NPR*MSCI(t=0) 0.001 0.004 0.007 
 (0.75) (0.85) (0.89) 
NPR*MSCI(t=1) -0.002 -0.009 -0.012 
 (1.74)* (2.52)** (1.84)* 
NPR*MSCI(t>=2) -0.002 -0.007 -0.013 
 (3.26)*** (3.72)*** (3.55)*** 
MSCI(t=-2) 0.016 0.051 0.116 
 (8.96)*** (9.02)*** (9.24)*** 
MSCI(t=-1) 0.031 0.099 0.214 
 (16.99)*** (17.27)*** (17.39)*** 
MSCI(t=0) 0.031 0.091 0.163 
 (19.39)*** (17.34)*** (14.27)*** 
MSCI(t=1) 0.020 0.056 0.110 
 (13.16)*** (11.93)*** (10.69)*** 
MSCI(t>=2) 0.022 0.063 0.118 
 (17.19)*** (15.03)*** (12.05)*** 
Past month return 0.002 0.017 0.023 
 (0.88) (2.52)** (1.94)* 
Past 12months return 0.000 -0.005 -0.016 
 (0.70) (3.12)*** (4.27)*** 
Log(Size) -0.044 -0.134 -0.275 
 (47.94)*** (36.88)*** (26.06)*** 
B/M 0.003 0.012 0.020 
 (4.89)*** (5.70)*** (4.39)*** 
NPR*Past month return 0.006 -0.004 0.001 
 (2.21)** (0.92) (0.09) 
NPR*Past 12 month return 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (1.00) (0.97) (0.27) 
NPR*Log(Size) -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 
 (2.74)*** (3.43)*** (4.62)*** 
NPR*B/M 0.001 0.004 0.009 
 (3.71)*** (3.69)*** (3.93)*** 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Country*time FE Y Y Y 
R2 0.17 0.25 0.32 
N 593,908 593,908 593,908 
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Table 6. The heterogeneous effects of foreign institutional ownership on insider trading profitability  
This table shows the heterogeneous effects of foreign investors on insider trading profitability conditioning on country characteristics. We classify all countries 
into two groups based on the proportion of insider trades in blackout period, insider-trading restriction, legal origin, government effectiveness, rule of law, and 
regulatory quality, and accounting and auditing quality. The dependent variable is future three months’ cumulative excess returns. We control for past one-month 
return, past twelve-month return, log(Size), book to market ratio, and the interaction of controls and NPR in all the regressions. All models include firm and 
country*time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  Low blackout High blackout 
Low Insider 
trading 
restriction 
High insider 
trading 
restriction 
Non-Common 
law 
Common Law 
Low 
Government 
Effectiveness 
High 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NPR 0.010 0.014 0.006 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.016 
 (3.92)*** (6.60)*** (1.96)** (9.03)*** (5.47)*** (5.70)*** (5.40)*** (7.30)*** 
NPR*IO_Total 0.008 0.001 0.011 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.009 
 (0.95) (0.33) (0.95) (1.40) (0.46) (0.58) (2.03)** (3.74)*** 
NPR*IO_Foreign -0.039 -0.017 -0.055 -0.004 -0.035 -0.023 -0.044 0.016 
 (2.75)*** (1.96)** (3.24)*** (0.56) (2.65)*** (2.53)** (4.24)*** (1.95)* 
IO_Total -0.024 -0.025 -0.032 -0.024 -0.033 -0.022 -0.026 0.002 
 (1.64) (3.75)*** (1.67)* (3.88)*** (2.28)** (3.33)*** (2.94)*** (0.26) 
IO_Foreign -0.050 -0.057 -0.128 -0.024 -0.017 -0.071 -0.013 -0.104 
 (1.92)* (3.42)*** (4.14)*** (1.51) (0.70) (4.17)*** (0.58) (5.90)*** 
Controls, Controls*NPR Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country*time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.15 
N 614,019 994,729 542,961 1,065,787 496,014 1,122,417 746,318 866,923 
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Low Rule of 
Law 
High Rule of 
Law 
Low Regulatory 
Quality 
High Regulatory 
Quality 
Low 
Accounting  
High 
Accounting 
Poor 
Auditing 
Good 
Auditing 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
NPR 0.011 0.014 0.008 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.007 0.021 
 (3.93)*** (7.14)*** (2.88)*** (7.74)*** (3.82)*** (7.83)*** (3.29)*** (7.87)*** 
NPR*IO_Total 0.022 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.001 -0.007 -0.003 
 (4.36)*** (1.22) (0.61) (2.01)** (0.66) (0.56) (1.26) (1.34) 
NPR*IO_Foreign -0.067 -0.012 -0.041 -0.015 -0.043 -0.018 -0.015 -0.013 
 (5.61)*** (1.51) (3.56)*** (1.90)* (1.79)* (2.17)** (1.33) (1.38) 
IO_Total -0.060 -0.026 -0.068 -0.032 -0.022 -0.021 -0.011 -0.027 
 (3.36)*** (3.90)*** (4.25)*** (4.98)*** (0.85) (3.29)*** (0.96) (3.73)*** 
IO_Foreign -0.033 -0.041 -0.029 -0.031 -0.063 -0.059 -0.087 -0.026 
 (1.13) (2.53)** (1.06) (1.87)* (1.78)* (3.63)*** (4.17)*** (1.36) 
Controls, Controls*NPR Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country*time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.12 
N 522,959 1,090,306 541,464 1,071,846 353,755 1,145,890 827,387 781,361 
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Table 7. Legal origin of foreign institutional investors  
This table shows the panel regression results of the effect of foreign investors on insider trading profitability. The 
dependent variable is future 1, 3, and 6-months cumulative excess returns. IO_Foreign(Civil) and 
IO_Foreign(Common) represents the ownership of the firm by foreign institutional investors from civil-  and common-
law countries, respectively. All models include firm and country*time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The sample 
period is from 2000 to 2015. 
 
 
 
 Cumulative 1 month Cumulative 3 months Cumulative 6 months 
 (1) (2)     (3) 
NPR 0.006 0.011 0.019 
 (7.72)*** (7.00)*** (6.58)*** 
NPR*IO_Total -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 
 (2.96)*** (2.12)** (2.12)** 
NPR*IO_Foreign(Civil) -0.015 -0.031 -0.038 
 (1.62) (1.49) (1.03) 
NPR*IO_Foreign(Common) -0.007 -0.022 -0.045 
 (1.66)* (2.44)** (2.69)*** 
IO_Total -0.010 -0.022 -0.032 
 (3.74)*** (3.75)*** (2.77)*** 
IO_Foreign(Civil) -0.009 -0.084 -0.187 
 (0.73) (2.68)*** (3.11)*** 
IO_Foreign(Common) -0.006 -0.057 -0.135 
 (0.96) (3.43)*** (4.22)*** 
Past month return -0.028 -0.024 -0.020 
 (17.88)*** (13.86)*** (8.63)*** 
Past 12 months return 0.004 0.007 0.011 
 (11.93)*** (11.46)*** (10.30)*** 
Log(Size) -0.030 -0.065 -0.130 
 (60.92)*** (61.55)*** (63.95)*** 
B/M 0.003 0.007 0.011 
 (7.18)*** (9.15)*** (6.99)*** 
NPR*Past month return -0.001 0.002 0.007 
 (0.48) (0.91) (2.41)** 
NPR*Past 12 month return 0.002 0.005 0.007 
 (5.88)*** (7.78)*** (6.89)*** 
NPR*Log(Size) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (3.73)*** (1.87)* (2.08)** 
NPR*B/M 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (2.27)** (0.69) (0.11) 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Country*time FE Y Y Y 
R2 0.09 0.14 0.20 
N 1,618,431 1,618,431 1,618,431 
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Table 8. Controlling for information environment proxies 
This table shows the panel regression results of the effect of foreign investors on insider trading profitability, controlling for the information environment proxies 
of the firm. The dependent variable is future 3-months cumulative excess returns. In Column (2), Ln(Analyst coverage+1) is the natural logarithm of the number 
of analysts following a given firm. In Column (4), forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst EPS forecasts scaled by the absolute value of consensus 
forecast, provided at least two analysts following a given firm. In Column (6), forecast error is the absolute value of the difference between consensus EPS forecast 
and actual EPS, scaled by the absolute value of actual EPS. In Column (8), price non-synchronicity is defined as in Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2006). We control 
for past one-month return, past twelve-month return, log(Size), book to market ratio, and the interaction of controls and NPR in all the regressions. All models 
include firm and country*time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. The sample period is from 2000 to 2015. 
 
Cumulative 3 months return 
 Ln(Analyst coverage+1) Forecast dispersion Forecast error Price non-synchronicity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NPR 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.012 
 (7.03)*** (6.91)*** (6.48)*** (5.21)*** (5.31)*** (4.97)*** (7.03)*** (4.17)*** 
NPR*IO_Total -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 
 (2.23)** (1.06) (2.71)*** (2.01)** (0.45) (0.29) (2.23)** (2.60)*** 
NPR*IO_Foreign -0.023 -0.021 -0.024 -0.024 -0.025 -0.025 -0.023 -0.026 
 (3.69)*** (3.32)*** (3.26)*** (3.25)*** (3.42)*** (3.38)*** (3.69)*** (4.05)*** 
IO_Total -0.023 -0.023 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.023 -0.023 
 (3.86)*** (3.76)*** (3.61)*** (3.56)*** (3.36)*** (3.36)*** (3.86)*** (3.76)*** 
IO_Foreign -0.057 -0.056 -0.060 -0.061 -0.046 -0.047 -0.057 -0.051 
 (4.12)*** (4.11)*** (3.59)*** (3.64)*** (2.75)*** (2.80)*** (4.12)*** (3.67)*** 
NPR*Information proxy  -0.001  0.007  0.001  -0.001 
  (2.25)**  (3.75)***  (1.08)  (0.41) 
Information proxy  -0.000  -0.029  -0.002  -0.007 
  (0.48)  (14.80)***  (5.07)***  (2.67)*** 
Controls, Controls*NPR Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country*time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14 
N 1,618,431 1,618,431 828,697 828,697 839,524 839,524 1,501,543 1,501,543 
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Table 9. Foreign institutional ownership and insider trading behavior 
This table reports the effect of foreign institutional ownership on the distribution of insider trades, estimated using firm-year panel for the sample 2000-2015. 
Column (1) to (3) examine the size and number of insider trades. Log(#Trades) denotes the natural logarithm of number of insider trades for each firm within a 
year. Log(Value) is the natural logarithm of the average transaction size (in EUR). Log(Total_Value) represents the natural logarithm of the total transaction size 
within the year. Column (4) and (5) examine the distribution of insider sells, including both the sells number fraction (
#𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙
#𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙+#𝐵𝑢𝑦
 ) and the total sells size fraction 
( 
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒+𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
 ). Column (6) and (7) show distribution of insider trades that lie in the one month after the earnings announcement date. Dependent variable 
After_EA(#) Fraction is the fraction of insider trades for the firm-year that occurs in the one month after the earnings announcement date. Similarly, After_EA(Value) 
Fraction represents the specification calculated using total transaction size. We control for beginning of year one-month return, twelve-months return, natural 
logarithm of market capitalization, and B/M ratio. We also control for the informativeness of earnings announcements by including the average absolute earnings 
announcement cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the contemporaneous year. CAR is defined over the t-10 to t+2 window around the earnings announcement 
date t. All models include firm and country*time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is from 2000 to 2015. 
 
 Log(#Trades) Log(Value) Log(Total_Value) Sell(#) Fraction 
Sell(Value) 
Fraction 
After_EA(#) 
Fraction 
After_EA(Value) 
Fraction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
IO_Total -0.106 -0.122 -0.243 -0.017 -0.031 0.007 0.014 
 (2.15)** (1.81)* (2.56)** (1.01) (1.70)* (0.46) (0.85) 
IO_Foreign 0.177 -0.579 -0.463 -0.155 -0.196 0.108 0.115 
 (1.51) (3.19)*** (1.94)* (3.53)*** (4.12)*** (2.87)*** (2.50)** 
Past month return 0.009 0.146 0.169 0.072 0.073 -0.008 -0.018 
 (0.40) (3.79)*** (3.36)*** (7.77)*** (7.40)*** (1.10) (1.95)* 
Past 12 months return 0.050 0.102 0.156 0.022 0.024 -0.004 -0.003 
 (11.71)*** (11.76)*** (13.81)*** (9.29)*** (9.25)*** (2.96)*** (1.72)* 
Log(Size) 0.121 0.429 0.562 0.054 0.070 0.017 0.038 
 (19.21)*** (38.72)*** (39.99)*** (21.45)*** (25.91)*** (8.65)*** (15.86)*** 
B/M -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (3.25)*** (0.57) (0.98) (0.79) (0.92) (2.11)** (1.91)* 
|CAR[-10,2]| 0.383 0.409 0.808 -0.078 -0.045 0.378 0.523 
 (7.10)*** (4.65)*** (6.84)*** (3.91)*** (2.13)** (17.48)*** (18.15)*** 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.52 0.60 0.59 0.54 0.51 0.48 0.47 
N 112,464 112,464 112,464 112,464 112,461 112,464 112,464 
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Table 10. Top tier vs. Low tier insiders  
This table reports the panel regression results of the effect of foreign investors on insider trading profitability. Insiders’ 
net purchase ratio NPR is decomposed into NPR(Top) and NPR(Low) depending on whether the trade is conducted 
by top insiders or non-top insiders. Top insiders are defined as the executive board, chairman, and top 5 executives. 
Non-top insiders are the remaining insiders. NPR(Top) is constructed using only top insiders’ trades. Similarly, 
NPR(Low) is constructed using only non-top insiders’ trades. The dependent variables are future 1, 3 and 6 months 
cumulative excess returns. Cumulative excess return is calculated as the cumulative raw return in excess of the 
corresponding country’s market return. All models include firm and country*time fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The sample period is from 2000 to 2015. 
 
 
 Cumulative 1 month Cumulative 3 months Cumulative 6 months 
 (1) (2) (3) 
NPR(Top)*IO_Total -0.002 -0.005 -0.009 
 (3.48)*** (2.90)*** (2.73)*** 
NPR(Top)*IO_Foreign -0.008 -0.026 -0.047 
 (3.42)*** (3.85)*** (3.98)*** 
NPR(Low)*IO_Total -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 
 (1.36) (2.02)** (1.92)* 
NPR(Low)*IO_Foreign -0.004 -0.014 -0.025 
 (1.82)* (2.06)** (2.14)** 
IO_Total -0.008 -0.023 -0.033 
 (3.78)*** (3.88)*** (2.88)*** 
IO_Foreign -0.015 -0.057 -0.136 
 (3.30)*** (4.11)*** (5.09)*** 
NPR(Top) 0.003 0.007 0.013 
 (9.10)*** (7.67)*** (7.33)*** 
NPR(Low) 0.003 0.007 0.011 
 (7.98)*** (7.27)*** (6.47)*** 
Past month return -0.027 -0.024 -0.020 
 (25.79)*** (13.88)*** (8.65)*** 
Past 12 months return 0.004 0.008 0.011 
 (13.72)*** (11.51)*** (10.37)*** 
Log(Size) -0.022 -0.065 -0.131 
 (59.43)*** (61.55)*** (63.97)*** 
B/M 0.002 0.007 0.011 
 (7.94)*** (9.09)*** (6.93)*** 
NPR*Past month return 0.001 0.002 0.006 
 (0.55) (0.85) (2.32)** 
NPR*Past 12 month return 0.002 0.005 0.007 
 (6.99)*** (7.69)*** (6.81)*** 
NPR*Log(Size) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.94) (0.83) (0.94) 
NPR*B/M 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (2.03)** (1.36) (0.79) 
Firm FE                Y                Y                Y 
Country*Time FE                Y                Y                Y 
R2 0.09 0.14  0.20 
N          1,618,431          1,618,431         1,618,431 
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Figure 1. Cross-country insider trading profitability and country characteristics  
The figures plot the cross-country relation between insider trading profitability and several country characteristics. Insider trading profitability for each country, 
measured by the average monthly long-short portfolio return based on NPR, is shown in y axis.  The x axis shows country characteristics, including the average 
foreign and domestic institutional ownership, the accounting quality index in LaPorta et al. (1998), auditing quality, fraction of trades in Blackout period from 
Brochet (2017), insider trading restriction score from Du and Wei (2004), and three worldwide governance indicators including government effectiveness, rule of 
law, and regulatory quality.  
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Figure 2. Predictability of insider trading Surrounding the Additions to MSCI 
This figure shows coefficient estimates and 95% confidence interval of the differences in NPR predictability between 
treated firms and control forms around stock additions to the MSCI ACWI index. The sample is restricted to firms in 
the 20% bandwidth of the number of stocks around the MSCI ACWI cutoff point in each country. The difference in 
NPR predictability is captured by the coefficient estimates of the interaction terms of NPR and MSCI timing dummies, 
as in Table 5 Panel C. Year 0 is the year when the treated firms added to the MSCI ACWI index. Graph A shows the 
coefficients plot for dependent variable of future three-month cumulative excess return. Graph B shows the 
coefficients plot for dependent variable of future six-month cumulative excess return.  
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Graph A: NPR Predictability (3 months)
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Graph B: NPR Predictability (6 months)
